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INTRODUCTION

The Global Recession of 2008 and ensuing austerity measures have
renewed the urgency surrounding the call for fundamental tax reform. 1 In the
United States, the so-called “fiscal cliff” and the automatic budget cuts imposed
under the name of “sequestration” have decisively linked tax reform with the
ongoing fight over budget priorities, both in the minds of the American public and
their elected representatives.2 This brinksmanship approach to policy making has
squarely placed tax reform within the wider rubric of fiscal reform, thus marking
the end of tax exceptionalism and severely compromising the established goal of
revenue neutrality.3 Tax reform in the face of staggering federal deficits will have
to respond to political concerns over revenue and spending levels, and there will
be clear “winners and losers.” 4 Before embarking on fundamental tax reform,
however, this Article proposes adding a critical lens to existing U.S. tax policy to
ensure that any proposals for change are informed, transparent, and responsive to
the needs and abilities of individual taxpayers.

1

Nelson D. Schwartz, Austerity Reigns Over Euro Zone as Crisis Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2012, at A1. See also MARK BYLTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA (2013)
(describing the roots of “austerity” as an economic political strategy). In terms of fundamental tax
reform, this Article focuses almost exclusively on issues related to the federal personal income tax.
2
Jennifer Steinhauer, Under Pressure, House Approves Senate Tax Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
2013, at A1.
3
The term “tax exceptionalism” is most frequently used in the context of administrative law
norms where taxpayers have long-argued that Treasury regulations were entitled to a lower
standard of deference than required by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The notion that “tax is different” for purposes of
judicial review was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 716 (2011). See Kristin E. Hickman, The
Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537,
1541 (2006) (arguing against the view that “tax is different or special” and therefore, not like other
areas of law).
4
See THE PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY PANEL, THE REPORT ON TAX REFORM
OPTIONS: SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION [hereinafter PERAP TAX
REPORT] (August 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf.
According to the Report, “revenue neutrality by income class might result in increases or
decreases in tax liability for subgroups or individual taxpayers within each income class—that is,
revenue neutrality might result in ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’” Id. at v. When looking at tax reform
across income class, the prospect of raising tax rates for higher income taxpayers has led to
charges of “class warfare.” See Doug Bandow, The Path To Tax Reform: Cutting Taxes For Those
Who Pay For Them, FORBES, Sept. 10, 2012, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/09/10/the-path-to-tax-reform-cutting-taxes-forthose-who-pay-for-them/ (observing that “[t]axes also offer a means for the Democrats to play
their traditional class war card”).
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In many ways, traditional tax policy is ill-equipped to navigate the political
demands and trade-offs inherent in fiscal reform.5 Primarily focused on macro
distributional concerns, the public welfare perspective of traditional tax policy
intentionally looks past the identities of individual taxpayers, with the exception
of income level.6 It is self-consciously indifferent to the impact that taxation can
have on existing social, political, and economic disparities in terms of
participation or access and does not acknowledge the various ways that tax policy
can reinforce existing inequities or biases.7 As a result, our facially neutral tax
practices can sometimes produce a string of unintended consequences that,
although objectively undesirable, traditional tax policy would consider both
irrelevant to its goals and beyond its power to correct.8 Critical tax policy can help
policymakers evaluate these unintended consequences and pierce the structural
assumptions of neutrality.
It has been almost thirty years since the United States last undertook the
collective project of fundamental tax reform. 9 Since that time, a growing
international consensus has emerged regarding the connection between taxation
and inequality,10 as well as a sophisticated and vibrant critique of the U.S. tax
5

Albert R. Hunt, Slim Chance for Tax Fix as Things Are, INT’L HERALD TRIB, Mar. 18, 2013, at 2
(asserting that increasing polarization in Congress makes a major tax “overhaul next to
impossible”).
6
See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
(2002). Murphy and Nagel assert that: “Justice or injustice in taxation can only mean justice or
injustice in the system of property rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax regime.”
Id. at 8.
7
See id. at 26 (discussing the “purely economic impact” of the “justice of taxation”).
8
For example, the combined effect of the marital filing provisions and the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) has historically produced a strong penalty upon marriage for low-income taxpayers
eligible for the EITC. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 146-50 (1997); see also Ann
L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108
HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided some
relief for the marriage penalty and expended the credit for some families, but it did not eliminate
the penalty. John J. Fichtner & Jacob Feldman, Taxing Marriage: Microeconomic Behavioral
Responses to the Marriage Penalty and Reforms for the 21st Century, Sept. 12, 2012, available at
http://mercatus.org/publication/taxing-marriage-microeconomic-behavioral-responses-marriagepenalty-and-reforms-21st.
9
The result was the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which drastically broadened the tax base and
flattened rates while adhering to the mandate of revenue neutrality. Bruce Bartlett, The Tax
Reform Act of 1986: Should We Do It Again?, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Oct. 18, 2011, 6:00AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/18/the-tax-reform-act-of-1986-should-we-do-itagain/. See also JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987).
10
See, e.g., UNDP, Issues Brief: Gender Equality and Poverty Reduction – Taxation (Apr. 2010),
available at
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/gender/Gender%20and%20Poverty%20Reduction/
Taxation%20English.pdf. This consensus has recognized that even the best intended tax systems
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policy known as critical tax theory.11 This Article explores how the insights of
both developments can lead to the creation of a critical tax policy that is built on
the articulation of difference rather than false assumptions of sameness. It argues
for a tax policy that is transparent and responsive to individuals; one that
acknowledges its constitutive role as part of a larger “blueprint for the aims and
ambitions of the nation state.”12
In many ways, these insights build on the tax expenditure concept that is
now an accepted mainstay of tax policy. 13 Originally developed to further
transparency and promote better budgeting practices, the tax expenditure concept
exposes how a tax system designed to raise revenue can also contain hidden
expenditures in the form of indirect spending. 14 In the 1970s, Stanley Surrey
argued that the failure to acknowledge the vast indirect spending in the tax code
compromised the integrity of the budgeting process. 15 Congress responded by
mandating the creation of the Tax Expenditure Budget, which accounts for the
indirect spending by budget function.16
The three classic pillars of tax policy—equity, efficiency, and ease of
administration—aim to design a system of taxation that fairly apportions the
burdens of citizenship, minimizes tax distortions in economic behavior, and
simplifies the task of compliance and administration. 17 These organizing
principles reflect widely-held equality and autonomy norms but proceed from a
very strong presumption of taxpayer neutrality where the only salient distinction
among taxpayers is that of income level.18 In other words, U.S. tax policy does
not take into account demographic differences among taxpayers, such as race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity, nor does it attempt to
have the ability to entrench existing disparities, and it has urged policy makers “to be aware of the
extent to which tax policies . . . reinforce or break down. . . inequalities.” Id. at 4.
11
See, e.g., CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford
eds., 2009) (excerpting over fifty articles written from a critical tax theory perspective).
12
ANN MUMFORD, TAX POLICY, WOMEN AND THE LAW 3 (2009) (crediting Joseph Schumpeter
with the observation regarding the budget function).
13
See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES
(1973).
14
See also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).
15
SURREY, supra note 13. Stanley Surrey was the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy in 1968 when he coined the term “tax expenditures” to refer to provisions that represented a
departure from the normally accepted principles of income and are designed to achieve the same
results usually accomplished through direct spending. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, A
RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS (May 12, 2008), available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1196.
16
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–344,
88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688 (2006)).
17
C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY US TAX POLICY 10 (2004).
18
Id. (“In the tax laws, horizontal equity—often called equal justice—asserts that those with equal
ability to pay should pay equal taxes”).
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evaluate the potentially disparate impact of taxation on the members of these
groups. 19 The Internal Revenue Service does not collect information regarding
demographic characteristics, making it extremely difficult to “put a face on
America’s tax returns.”20
By viewing taxpayers only in terms of income level, tax policy is free to
consider distributional issues without having to account for countervailing
concerns such as gender or race equity. 21 For example, the fiction of taxpayer
neutrality is a constituent feature of optimal tax theory, which seeks to maximize
social welfare by identifying the optimal tax base.22 Increasingly, however, this
strong presumption of tax neutrality is out of step with emerging international
norms. 23 Tax equity initiatives undertaken by the United Nations, NGOs, and
adopted by numerous countries all recognize the connection between gender and
taxation.24 For example, a 2010 United Nations Development Programme Issues
Brief cautions that “[p]olicy makers need to be aware of the extent to which tax
policies . . . reinforce or break down gender inequalities.”25
19

The Internal Review Service (IRS) does not collect demographic data, thereby complicating any
attempt to “put a face on America’s tax returns.” The Tax Foundation, a non-partisan tax research
group, has started a project called Putting a Face on America’s Tax Returns that is designed to
provide enhanced information about who actually pays taxes. Tax Foundation, Putting a Face on
America’s Tax Returns: A Chart Book (2012), available at
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/putting_a_face_on_americas_tax_return
s_chartbook.pdf. The project uses tax statistics and Census data, but it does not provide a
breakdown of the information based on race, ethnicity, or gender. Id. It does provide information
based on age and educational level. Id. at 25-30.
20
Id.
21
Tony Infanti refers to the sole focus on income as the “homogenizing effect.” Anthony C.
Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1206 (2007-2008) (discussing “equity’s systematic
erasure of all but the economic dimension of individuals”).
22
See generally J.A. Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theory: A Synthesis, 6 JOUR. PUBL. ECON. 327 (1976)
(outlining necessary conditions for optimal taxation).
23
See generally TAXATION AND GENDER EQUITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIRECT AND
INDIRECT TAXES IN DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Caren Grown & Imraan Valodia
eds., 2010) (examining the relationship between gender and taxation in eight countries: Argentina,
Ghana, India, Mexico, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda, and the United Kingdom).
24
See UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10. For example, the United Kingdom and South Africa
“have undertaken reforms to remove explicit gender biases in their personal income tax laws, no
personal income tax system can yet be classified as transforming unequal gender relations.” Caren
Grown, Taxation and Gender Equality: A Conceptual Framework, in TAXATION AND GENDER
EQUITY, supra note 23, at 1, 17. A number of countries have instituted gender-responsive
budgeting initiatives, starting with Australia in 1994. UN Women, Gender Responsive Budgeting,
http://www.genderbudgets.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=112 (last visited Sept.
4, 2013). To date, there are over forty gender-responsive-budgeting initiatives being implemented
across the world. Id.
25
Id. at 4.
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The presumption of taxpayer neutrality has also come under sustained
critique by a group of U.S. tax scholars who self-identify as critical tax scholars
and write from a relatively diverse range of perspectives, including critical race
theory, 26 feminist legal theory, 27 and queer theory. 28 These critical tax scholars
have exposed implicit bias in the tax system by examining facially neutral tax
provisions to illustrate how existing tax law and policy can both reflect and
reinforce disparities based on race or ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender or
gender identity/expression, sexual orientation, and disability. 29 They have also
explored explicit bias by engaging the more obviously gendered or otherwise
exclusionary provisions of the tax code, such as the marital provisions,30 and the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the joint filing provisions.31
U.S. tax policy debates have largely ignored the international developments
connecting taxation with inequality, as well as the contributions of critical tax
scholars. 32 This Article argues that federal tax policy would benefit from the
addition of a critical lens or perspective and explores a number of ways to
integrate these collective insights toward the creation of a truly critical tax policy.
By considering the impact of tax policy on marginalized taxpayers at the outset,
policymakers will have the opportunity to avoid (or at least openly acknowledge)
the types of persistent disparities and inequities that have been catalogued by
26

See, e.g., Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,
1996 WIS. L. Rev. 751(1996); Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and
White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787 (1997); Alice G. Abreu, Tax Counts: Bringing Money-Law to
LatCrit, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 575 (2001); Mylinh Uy, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian
Americans, 11 ASIAN L. J. 117 (2004).
27
See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L. J. 1571
(1996); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Taxing Woman: The Relationship of Feminist Scholarship to
Tax, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 301 (1997).
28
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY
REV. LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1991); Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and
Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998); Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue
Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004).
29
See, e.g., Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to Pay and the
Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053 (2006).
30
See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 8, at 58-88 (describing the joint filing provision and the
“marriage penalty” and “marriage bonus”).
31
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI. KENT L. REV. 481,
483 (2009). As a result of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Windsor, legally
married same-sex couples are now considered married for federal tax purposes. See infra text
accompanying notes 164-72.
32
Critical tax scholarship was the subject of intense criticism by mainstream tax scholars. In 1998,
the North Carolina Law Review devoted an entire issue to an extended critique of critical tax
theory. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV 1749,
1749 (1998); Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited
Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV 1729, 1734 (1998).
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critical tax scholars and international tax equity efforts. In this way, the addition
of a critical lens has the potential to reveal the false neutrality of tax provisions,
just as the tax expenditure concept made indirect spending visible to policymakers
in the 1970s. 33 Professor Stanley Surrey taught a generation that the choice not to
tax is often equivalent to spending.34 Similarly, critical tax policy can illustrate
how stated considerations of equity and neutrality could actually serve to reify
and perpetuate inequity.35
Critical tax scholars have identified three common themes that have direct
relevance for U.S. tax policy makers: (1) current taxpayer information is
insufficient to measure the incidence of taxation across different demographics;
(2) neutrality principles can obscure existing disparities in the distribution of tax
benefits and burdens; and (3) the insistence on taxpayer neutrality can lead to
unintended and undesirable consequences. This article takes up each of these
issues in turn and addresses how each concern could be addressed within the
existing income tax system using familiar administrative or legislative measures.
For example, the question of insufficient taxpayer information could be addressed
through enhanced data collection. Although this solution may present its own set
of negative externalities and objections, it illustrates that the answer to the basic
question posed by critical tax theory—how is the burden of taxation allocated
across different groups within society—is not unknowable.36
33

See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current
Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 263 (1979).
34
Id. Surrey and McDaniel explained the distinction between direct and indirect spending as
follows:
Put differently, whenever government decides to favor an activity or group
through monetary assistance, it may elect from a wide range of methods in
delivering that assistance. Direct assistance may take the form of a government
grant or subsidy, a government loan, perhaps at a special interest rate, or a
private loan guaranteed by the government: Instead of direct assistance, the
government may work within the income tax system to reduce the tax otherwise
owed by a favored activity or group.
Id. at 228.
35
Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION, at xxii (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009) (noting “critical tax
scholars’ assertion that the tax laws . . . reflect and even reify discrimination based on race,
gender, sexual orientation, class, disability, or family structure”).
36
Enhanced data collection would also answer a longstanding evidentiary objection to the critical
tax project, namely that it was impossible to substantiate disparate impact because there is no
national data set of taxpayer information based on race or other identity characteristics. Richard
Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal Income Tax: Has A Disparate Impact Case Been Made?, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1834 (1998). As explained infra in Part III, this objection presents a classic
Catch-22 and illustrates the closed nature of a tax policy bounded by neutrality. Critical tax theory

212

Vol. 9.2]

Nancy J. Knaur

The two remaining concerns could also be addressed through enhanced
reporting and transparency, which admittedly would also raise a host of questions.
With respect to the issue of the disparate distribution of tax benefits and burdens,
the practice of gender-sensitive budgeting has shown that it is possible (and
sometimes desirable) to track expenditures and spending to determine the impact
of programs and policies on specific disadvantaged groups within society. 37
Critical tax policy would support the creation of a diversity expenditure budget to
provide essential information to tax policy makers regarding the incidence and
burden of taxation that would not only be relevant for tax purposes but also for
broader social-entitlement programs.38 The question of unintended consequences
could likewise be addressed at the outset through the use of a diversity impact
assessment that would be analogous to an environmental impact statement39 or the
minority impact assessments that are gaining support at the state level, especially
in the context of sentencing issues.40 Each of these proposals would further the
goals of critical tax policy to make tax policy more informed, transparent, and
responsive to the needs of individual taxpayers, but each proposal also comes
with its own set of costs. Accordingly, they do not represent an exhaustive list but
rather a starting point for the ongoing project of building a truly critical tax
policy.
The first Part of the Article engages the multiple claims of neutrality within
U.S. tax policy. Arguing that tax policy should be viewed as a component of
fiscal policy, it uses the insights of both international tax equity initiatives and
critical tax scholarship to make the case for greater transparency. Part II then
cannot substantiate its claims because there is no national data set of taxpayer information that
includes demographic information such as race, gender, or ethnicity. Federal income tax returns do
not collect information on race because under prevailing tax policy the only salient distinguishing
feature between taxpayers is income level.
37
See generally Lisa Phillips & Miranda Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, Domestic
Laws, and the Politics of Budgets, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 797, 843 (2009) (describing the advent of
“gender budgeting”).
38
In 1998, Beverly Moran proposed that Congress should be required to prepare a “Race
Expenditure Budget.” Beverly I. Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can We Ever Know Anything
About Race and Tax? 76 N.C.L. REV. 1629, 1634 (1998).
39
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (2011), requiring the development of the Environmental Impact
Statement.
40
In 2008, Iowa enacted legislation requiring a “minority impact statement” for all legislative
action involving sentencing. Dana Boone, Iowa to Require ‘Minority Impact Statements’ for
Proposed Criminal Legislation, IOWA INDEP. Apr. 17, 2008, available at
http://iowaindependent.com/2220/iowa-to-require-minority-impact-statements-for-proposedcriminal-legislation (reporting on background of bill). The law gained support after statistics
showed that Iowa led the nation in its rate of incarceration for African Americans. Id. The sponsor
of the bill called the impact statement “a remarkable step in addressing the special circumstances
of Iowa’s minority population.” Id. For more information on the Iowa minority impact statement,
see infra text accompanying notes 288-92.
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moves to consider the construction of the critical lens. It discusses how to
determine which characteristics or group identifications are salient for purposes of
tax policy, recognizing that these conclusions can evolve and change over time
and across cultures. It also applies the lens to three different examples of bias
common in tax matters: explicit, implicit, and discretionary bias. Part III proposes
ways to enforce or implement the critical lens through policy innovations or
safeguards that draw on longstanding institutional practices and procedures. These
proposals include: (1) enhanced information collection; (2) the creation of a
diversity expenditure budget; and (3) the requirement of a diversity impact
statement. A brief conclusion acknowledges the additional costs and
considerations involved with each of these proposals and reiterates that this is
only the beginning of a much longer conversation regarding how to develop an
informed, transparent, and responsive critical tax policy: one that recognizes that
the goal of equity does not demand the denial of difference.
I.

THE COSTS OF FALSE NEUTRALITY

It goes without saying that the choices that a society makes regarding what,
whom, and when to tax can reveal quite a bit about what a society values.41 In the
United States, our tax policy does not inquire as to the effects of taxation on
historically disadvantaged groups or marginalized populations, but instead
focuses solely on income level. This post-identity approach reflects a strong
commitment to equality of opportunity and the desirability of an identity-blind
society. It also has obvious advantages for economic modeling. 42 It does not,
however, reflect the lived experience of millions of individuals for whom

41

See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Through the Looking Glass With Alice and Larry: The Nature
of Scholarship, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1609, 1609 (1998) (noting that “taxes also tell us more generally
about our society since what we tax and how we tax reflect a multitude of philosophical, social,
and political choices”).
42
With respect to the theory of optimal taxation, Linda Sugin observed:
Users of the model can input various patterns of income distribution and
efficiency costs of taxation to evaluate alternative tax regimes. The model is
amenable to different definitions of distributional fairness and can adjust to
accommodate specific limitations in tax design that may arise from political or
administrative constraints. Because of the model’s wide range and flexibility,
the optimal tax literature is extensive, and offers insights on many fundamental
tax policy issues, including the two most paradigmatic—progressivity and
choice of tax base.

Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 229
(2011).
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numerous and overlapping identity markers—race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity—continue to have social and political salience.
The importance of these identity characteristics are not lost on policy
makers in a number of other contexts, such as labor and employment, health care,
and housing. In each of these areas, federal policy specifically addresses the
impact of legislative and regulatory choices on historically disadvantaged groups
and marginalized populations.43 A critical approach to tax policy maintains that,
as a component of a larger “blueprint” of collective goals and priorities, taxation
should acknowledge the continued relevance of identity characteristics, existing
disparities, and persistent inequities. Moreover, it should recognize that the failure
to take these considerations into account can lead to unintended consequences—
facially neutral tax policy can sometimes reinforce and reify the very inequities
that it currently chooses to ignore.
This Part engages the multiple claims of neutrality that combine to construct
the prevailing understanding of tax exceptionalism. 44 It first discusses the
spending function that is inherent within the current structure of the personal
income tax and the transparency gains afforded by the tax expenditure concept. It
then focuses on the neutrality fictions inherent in traditional tax policy and the
growing international consensus regarding the important connection between
taxation and equality goals. A final section explores the critical tax theory
movement in greater detail and describes its major contributions, as well as the
less than welcoming reception it has received from mainstream tax scholars
committed to taxpayer neutrality.
A. All Part of a Larger “Blueprint”
In 2011, the federal government received $2.3 trillion in revenues, of which
$1.1 trillion came from the personal income tax.45 However, the amount that the
federal government could have collected through the personal income tax was
considerably higher—almost twice that amount. Budget estimates for 2011 show
that the federal personal income tax distributed to taxpayers over $965 billion in

43

For a discussion of the many instances where the federal government collects and uses
demographic information, see infra text accompanying notes 221-32.
44
The term tax exceptionalism is most often used to refer to a longstanding argument that
Treasury Regulations should not be granted the same degree of judicial deference as directed
under Chevron. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984). For a discussion of tax exceptionalism and the belief that “tax is different” see
supra note 3.
45
Jonathan Schwabish & Courtney Griffith, The U.S. Federal Budget, Congressional Budget
Office, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/budgetinfographic.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013). The revenue from the personal income tax represented 7.3% of GDP. Id.

215

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2012

tax expenditures,46 representing instances where the federal government chose not
to collect revenue in order to further other important social or economic policy
goals.47 Tax expenditures are sprinkled liberally throughout the tax code in the
form of exclusions, deductions, and credits. In each case, the decision to forego
revenue represents a form of indirect spending, such as when the federal
government chooses to subsidize home ownership through the mortgage interest
deduction or subsidize health care through the medical expense deduction.48
In the 1970s, Stanley Surrey lobbied strenuously to have this indirect
spending represented in the federal budget. 49 Recognizing that the amounts in
questions were significant, Surrey argued that the federal government’s choice to
forego revenue to which it is entitled is equivalent to spending. 50 The
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 adopted Surrey’s
tax expenditure concept and required the creation of a tax expenditure budget to
accompany the regular direct-spending budget.51 Organized by budget function,
the tax expenditure budget is designed to both give policymakers important
distributional information, as well as to make them more accountable for the
indirect spending that they authorize through the tax code. 52 As a theoretical
construct, tax expenditure analysis is now widely accepted, 53 although
46

Donald B. Marron, How Large Are Tax Expenditures?, TAX NOTES 1597 (March 28, 2011),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001526-Expenditure-Estimates.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013).
47
See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33, at 228 (explaining that tax expenditures “[w]hatever
their form . . . essentially represent government spending for the favored activities or groups”).
48
The mortgage interest deduction is allowed under section 163(h) of the I.R.C. §163(h) (2012).
The medical expense deduction is allowed under section 213 of the IRC.
49
SURREY, supra note 13.
50
Surrey and McDaniel explained that tax expenditures are:
departures from the normal tax structure, designed to favor a particular industry,
activity, or class of persons. Tax subsidies partake of many forms, such as
permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax liabilities,
credits against tax, or special rates. Whatever their form, these departures from
the “normative” income tax structure essentially represent government spending
for the favored activities or groups through the tax system rather than through
direct grants, loans, or other forms of government assistance.
Id. at 228.
51
The Treasury Department published its first tax expenditure budget in 1968. Id. at 226.
52
In addition, since 1972 the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has produced its own tax
expenditure list annually. Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates Of Federal Tax Expenditures
For Fiscal Years 2012-2017, Feb. 1, 2013, available at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4504 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
53
Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33, at 227 (reporting in 1979 that there had been “a rapid and
expanding recognition of that role the tax expenditure concept has in tax policy issues and budget
policy issues”).
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commentators have continuously questioned the appropriate way to distinguish
tax expenditures from the more structural components of the income tax.54 The
increased transparency resulting from this wide acceptance does not seem to have
dampened the appeal of tax expenditures. In 2011, the total amount of the
personal income tax expenditures exceeded the defense budget.55
There are numerous reasons why such high levels of indirect spending are
orchestrated through the personal income tax—some pragmatic and some
ideological. On the pragmatic side, the existing infrastructure of the tax system
allows Congress to engage in spending programs without the start-up costs
associated with new bureaucracy.56 The complexity of the tax code also affords
legislators the opportunity to hide subsidies for special interests far from the
prying eyes of watchdog groups.57 From an ideological perspective, some policy
makers might find it preferable to provide an indirect benefit to taxpayers, rather

54

Even its critics recognize that “[t]ax expenditure analysis has produced useful information for
legislators and tax policymakers, highlighting potential tax reforms and revenue raisers.” Edward
A. Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, YALE
L. J., ONLINE, May 24, 2011, http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supremecourt/winn-and-the-inadvisability-of-constitutionalizing-tax-expenditure-analysis. See also
Douglas A. Kahn, A Proposed Replacement Of The Tax Expenditure Concept And A Different
Perspective On Accelerated Depreciation, FLA. STA. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). When the
Joint Committee on Taxation reconsidered its definition of a tax expenditure in 2008, it concluded
[the] principal utility [of the tax expenditure concept] appears to have been as a
tool of tax policy and tax distributional analysis. The rhetoric of tax expenditure
analysis, and the economic reasoning that underlies that rhetoric, in fact can
provide a successful framework by which to judge the fairness, efficiency and
administrative consequences of many “incentive” proposals. Policymakers
further can look to tax expenditure analysis to provide insight into “base
broadening” and similar measures.
Joint Committee on Taxation, A Reconsideration of Tax Expenditure Analysis, May 12, 2008
available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1196 (last visited Apr. 1,
2013).
55
JONATHAN SCHWABISH & COURTNEY GRIFFITH, THE U.S. FEDERAL BUDGET, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/budgetinfographic.pdf. The revenue
from the personal income tax represented 7.3% of GDP. Id.
56
See Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing that
“a tax subsidy may be more efficient than an equivalent direct spending program because such a
subsidy uses the pre-existing tax system to communicate federal policy at relatively low marginal
cost”).
57
Id. at 1168 (noting a critique that tax expenditures were “not subject to the same scrutiny as
direct monetary expenditures”).
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than a direct transfer payment.58 Whatever the reason, the use of tax expenditures
shows no signs of abating, even as fundamental tax reform has called into
question the longevity of some of the more popular tax expenditures, such as the
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance or the mortgage interest
deduction.59
Even with the high levels of indirect spending within the tax code, federal
tax policy adheres to a strong presumption of taxpayer neutrality under which the
only relevant factor is income level. As a result, the federal government can
annually “spend,” in the form of tax expenditures, an amount greater than the total
defense expenditures without any ability to account for who benefits. The myth of
taxpayer neutrality means that not only does tax policy fail to track the
distribution of tax burdens, but it also fails to track the allocation of benefits.
Although this post-identity stance is useful for purposes of economic modeling, it
is inconsistent with a more nuanced concern for equity expressed in other areas of
federal policy, such as labor and employment, housing, and health care. In all of
these areas, federal policy acknowledges that certain identity markers and
classifications—such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and gender
identity—continue to have social, political, and economic salience.
Notwithstanding significant civil rights gains, this continued salience means that
efforts to promote equity will at times require attention to difference.
B. Hidden Choices and Embedded Values
Despite the real life importance of differences, assumptions of neutrality
abound in tax policy. There are frequently-voiced concerns over revenue
neutrality, 60 marriage neutrality, 61 and the general overarching goal of tax
58

The relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina provide an example of the preference for indirect
tax relief. The initial attempt to provide emergency relief through debit cards was roundly
criticized. Jordan Weissman, Did Katrina Victims Really Spend Their Relief Money on Gucci Bags
and Massage Parlors? THE ATLANTIC, (Oct. 31, 2012 ), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/10/did-katrina-victims-really-spend-their-reliefmoney-on-gucci-bags-and-massage-parlors/264377/. Those attempts were followed by a
comprehensive disaster tax relief bill, but many of its provisions represented significant departures
from normal tax policy and procedure, such as allowing the victims to report the storm losses they
incurred in 2005 on their 2004 amended tax returns in order to speed the refund. Katrina
Emergency Tax Relief Act (P.L. 109-73).
59
The mortgage interest deduction for a personal residence is provided under IRC § 163(h). The
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is found in IRC § 104. Both have been targeted
in recent discussions on tax reform. Ezra Klein, Tax Reform is Going to Be Really, Really Hard,
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2012) (asserting the “vast swaths of tax expenditures are essentially off
guard”), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 2012/08/10/tax-reform-is-going-tobe-really-really-hard.
60
Any large scale revamping of the tax system typically proceeds under the direction that the
result must be “revenue neutral.” See Daniel Shaviro, Tax Reform Implications of the Risk of a
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neutrality—meaning that a tax system should not distort economic decision
making.62 In addition to these explicit claims of neutrality, the very language of
taxation is premised on an assertion of neutrality and objectivity that is reinforced
by the quasi-scientific character of the Internal Revenue Code and its voluminous
Treasury Regulations.63 Unlike other areas of law, the bounded universe of the tax
code appears to offer clear answers and solutions. 64 In an almost mechanical
manner, Revenue Rulings recite facts, apply the law unfettered by doubt or
ambiguity, and pronounce generally applicable outcomes. The emphasis on
objective facts and economic reality conveniently looks past individual
differences and distinctions among taxpayers—with the exception of income
level. The resulting “patina of neutrality” 65 can obscure the normative choices
and value judgments that undergird contemporary tax policy. It can also retrench
existing disparities and persistent inequities.
1. Taxpayer neutrality
One core neutrality principle that often remains unstated is that of taxpayer
neutrality—the belief that identity characteristics are irrelevant for tax purposes.66
Instead, taxpayers are viewed in the aggregate, as abstractions arranged by
income level, which is itself an artificial construction of the tax code. 67

U.S. Budget Catastrophe, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 577, 583 (2012) (noting that the “the
dominant tax reform design has emphasized revenue neutrality, to be achieved by offsetting the
revenue gain from base-broadening by lowering income tax rates).
61
For the classic statement on marriage neutrality, see Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation
and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395-96 (1975).
62
STEUERLE, supra note 17, at 10.
63
See McCaffery, supra note 8, at 1 (“The mainstream tax policy academy legitimated the
structure of tax with a rhetoric of fairness, neutrality, and common sense.”).
64
Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
763, 767 (2004) (noting that “[i]n the traditional narrative, the Code is facially neutral and
progressive; it seems to benefit and burden all groups and, on the whole, to be tilted in favor of the
less fortunate because it demands less of them”).
65
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical
Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 486-87 (1987). She argues persuasively that economic
analysis “lends a patina of neutrality, because economics—particularly neoclassical economics—
is viewed by many non-economists (and even by some economists) as a ‘science,’ and therefore as
factual and objective.” Id.
66
See Infanti, supra note 21, at 1206 (noting the “homogenizing effect”). In terms of non-identity
based characteristics, the Code does take into account important factors such as, homeownership,
head of household status, and marital status. It also provides special relief in the form of a higher
standard deduction for taxpayers who are blind or 65 years of age or older. I.R.C. § 63(c)(3)
(2006).
67
Charles O. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Scholarship Seriously—A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1749 (1998). Galvin rejected the inquiries of critical tax theory and argued that “[a] better course
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Discussions regarding distributional concerns, questions of public welfare, and
the all-important quest for the optimal tax base do not consider the incidence of
taxation based on race or gender or ethnicity—only income level. With the
exception of critical tax theory, even progressive critiques of the tax system tend
to focus primarily on macro questions of economic or distributional justice that
accept the notion of taxpayer neutrality.68
The single focus on income level intentionally ignores other points of
difference that continue to have social meaning and salience—race, gender,
ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity—and deems them to be
irrelevant. As a result, tax policy is developed and implemented without regard to
any number of characteristics that may have a bearing on an individual’s tax
benefit or burden. The Report of President Obama’s Economic Recovery
Advisory Panel (PERAP) provides an example of this type of policy making.69
Tasked with simplifying the tax system in 2009, PERAP was directed by the
President not to propose any reform that would raise “taxes on families with
income of less than $250,000 a year.” 70 Although PERAP’s final
recommendations complied with this directive, its report acknowledged that it
“did not try to hold all taxpayers harmless in the options we evaluated.”71 To the
contrary, its report admitted that “revenue neutrality by income class might result
in increases or decreases in tax liability for subgroups or individual taxpayers
is to achieve neutrality by the attainment as nearly as possible of a pure Haig-Simons
comprehensive model or a pure consumed income model.” Id. at 1749.
68
See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 42, at 231. Linda Sugin presents a sophisticated and nuanced
critique of optimal tax theory based on a “philosophical understanding of fairness that incorporates
the role of taxation into a broader conception of a just society.” She observes that
A fair tax must satisfy the full range of demands that a just society places on
government exercising its coercive power over individuals. Applying that
philosophical approach to tax fairness reveals significant deficiencies in the
assumption that a tax on ability to earn is truly optimal as a matter of justice.
Id.
69

PERAP TAX REPORT, supra note 4. PERAP was assigned three separate tasks: “simplifying the
tax system, improving taxpayer compliance with existing tax laws, and reforming the corporate
tax system.” Id. The President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Panel (PERAP) is an outside
advisory panel comprised of academics, business leaders, and former government officials. Jeff
Zeleny, Panel to Advise Obama on Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/business/07web-econ.html?_r=0. PERAP is currently called
the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Anahad O’Connor,
Volker Out, Immelt In On Economic Board, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/business/economy/ 21volcker.html.
70
PERAP TAX REPORT, supra note 4, at v.
71
Id. The Report continued that “it would be impossible to do without substantial costs in terms of
lost revenues.” Id.
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within each income class—that is, revenue neutrality might result in ‘winners’
and ‘losers.’”72 Despite this reality, PERAP urged Congress to “select changes
that are desirable on their merits and not worry about the distributional effects of
each of them individually.”73
The principle of taxpayer neutrality not only says that the distributional
impact of the PERAP’s recommendations are irrelevant, it also ensures that they
are impossible to measure because taxpayer data broken down by race, ethnicity,
or gender does not exist. As noted earlier, there is an emerging international
consensus that, in spite of the common assumption, taxation is far from neutral. In
many ways, the international tax equity research supports the fundamental
insights of critical tax theory, but it employs economic research, rather than
critical theory to make its case. It uses country-specific methodologies that take
into account the structure of the domestic tax system, as well as other institutional
concerns.74 Its central conclusion is that policy makers “need to be mindful that
tax policies do not place undue burdens on the poor or the marginalized.”75 In
other words, policy makers must look through the false neutrality of taxation to
see the actual taxpayers and determine who bears the burdens and who reaps the
benefits.
2. Equity and efficiency
The overriding commitment to taxpayer neutrality within traditional U.S.
tax policy is reinforced by the all-important guiding principles of equity and
efficiency.76 Equity involves comparisons between and among taxpayers; whereas
efficiency refers to the choices taxpayers make. In the personal income tax
context, equity is usually expressed as two distinct yet related considerations:

72

Id. PERAP suggested that “entire package of options selected should be evaluated by the
Treasury or the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to see what impact it has on tax liability by
income class.” Id.
73
Id. The Report concluded that
If, as seems likely, the package raises taxes for some income groups and lowers
them for others, this could be offset by adjustments to the standard deduction,
tax rates or other provisions. Of course, even if the rates are adjusted to be
revenue neutral in each income class, there will be individual taxpayers who
gain and lose. We did not try to hold all taxpayers harmless in the options we
evaluated, and we were not asked to do so by the President. It would be
impossible to do so without substantial costs in terms of lost revenues.
Id.
74
Grown and Valodia, supra note 23.
75
UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10, at 4.
76
The third principle is the ease of administration or simplicity. STEUERLE, supra note 17, at 10.
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horizontal equity and vertical equity.77 Horizontal equity maintains that similarly
situated taxpayers should be treated the same.78 Vertical equity recognizes that a
progressive rate structure demands that higher income taxpayers pay a greater
amount of tax, and it also recognizes that higher income taxpayers will (and
should) be treated differently. 79 For purposes of both horizontal and vertical
equity, difference/sameness is measured solely in terms of income level.80
Of course, there is nothing inexorable about using income level as the
primary distinguishing feature between and among taxpayers. The decision that
income level is the only important distinguishing characteristic represents a
normative choice that privileges economic production and masks other
differences.81 As Tony Infanti has observed, the choice of income “sanitizes the
debate over tax fairness—cleansing it of uncomfortable discussions of racism,
sexism, heterosexism, and disability discrimination.” 82 Income level is also a
relatively unstable characteristic because it is necessarily a product of the very
system that it is then used to evaluate. Thus, questions of equity take on a very
bounded nature because a tax system is considered equitable if it treats similarly
situated taxpayers the same, but whether or not taxpayers are considered the
“same” is a function of the tax law and how it chooses to measure income.
The goal of efficiency, sometimes referred to as tax neutrality, also
reflects normative choices and embedded values that are by no means inexorable.
Efficiency holds that a tax system should minimize tax distortions, 83 but it
typically only seeks to measure these distortions with respect to market-based
decision making. Accordingly, the concept of efficiency begs the questions of
what constitutes a market-based decision, and where does one draw the line
between personal decision making and economic decision making? 84
77

Id.
Id.
79
Id at 11. Vertical equity could also address whether higher income taxpayers capture a
disproportionate share of certain tax benefits.
80
See Seto and Buhai, supra note 29, at 1073–74 (asserting that traditional tax theory has “almost
no capacity to deal with differences—other than differences of income—in taxpayers’ abilities to
pay taxes”).
81
See Infanti, supra note 21, 1195 (“This represents a normative choice to consider economic
differences—and only economic differences—in determining the fairness of a tax whose larger
purpose is to allocate the burden of funding our government and of paying for public services.”).
82
Id. at 1209 (“By assuming a far more homogeneous population than the one that actually exists,
horizontal and vertical equity screen from the tax policy debate many issues relating to race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, and they tend to transmute any remaining
issues into ones of economic class.”).
83
Tax expenditures and tax incentives violate this rule because they are designed to change
taxpayer behavior.
84
Karen Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral: New Tax Treatment of Employment
Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 223 (1998) (considering whether
78
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For example, the combination of the joint filing provisions and the
progressive rate structure can produce a disincentive for married women to enter
(or re-enter) the workforce due to the stacking effect. 85 Does this disincentive
raise an efficiency concern or is it merely a private non-market choice? 86
Similarly, the federal estate tax provisions include an unlimited marital deduction
for amounts payable to a surviving spouse, including amounts structured as a
“qualified terminable interest property” (QTIP) that do not grant the surviving
spouse substantial ownership rights.87 Some commentators have argued that these
QTIP provisions encourage the higher wealth spouse not to leave his property
outright to the surviving spouse but instead to leave the survivor a more limited
interest in the property. 88 Does the incentive provided by this tax-advantaged
option raise efficiency concerns or does it merely reflect a personal estate
planning decision?89
C. Critical Tax Theory and Scholarship
Critical tax theory emerged as a distinct area of scholarship almost two
decades ago. 90 It has clear roots in the tradition of critical legal studies, 91 as well
discrimination awards should be excluded from gross income as part of the cost of doing
business).
85
Staudt, supra note 27 (discussing how the tax laws deter women from entering the paid labor
market).
86
Smith v. Commission, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff’d, 113 F. 2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940) (denying the
deductibility of child care costs as a business expense).
87
I.R.C. §2056(b)(7) (2006).
88
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to
Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 301 (1996).
89
Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital
Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1734 (1998) (rejecting argument QTIP shows “respect” for
“wives and widows”).
90
Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi (writing in 2009 that “[i]n the last fifteen years, there
has emerged a small but steady stream of scholarship that . . . constitutes . . . ‘critical tax
scholarship’”). Professor Grace Blumberg is widely considered to have written the first
comprehensive outsider critique of the Tax Code in a 1971 law review article. Grace Blumberg,
Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21
BUFF. L. REV. 48 (1971). See also Marjorie J. Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imaging
the Income Tax, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 289, 325 (2002) (referring to Professor Blumberg as
the “mother of this area”); Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1574 (calling her early article a “pioneering
work of feminist tax analysis”).
91
Critical perspectives were fairly late to surface in the field of taxation. In contrast, the areas of
criminal law, constitutional law, contracts, environmental law, and property law all had a rather
robust output of critical scholarship starting in the late 1970s. See generally RICHARD W.
BAUMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE (1996). Several reasons have
been given for this late start, not the least of which is that scholars who were generally interested
in issues of social justice were put off by the highly technical nature of tax and its apparent remove
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as feminism and other methods of outsider scholarship, such as critical race
studies and queer theory.92 Leveled largely as a critique of the existing U.S. tax
structure, 93 critical tax theory has challenged the presumed objectivity and
neutrality of a tax theory based primarily on economic modeling. 94 It has also
taken issue with many of the specific claims of neutrality discussed in the
previous section. By challenging the objective neutrality of the tax code, critical
tax theory attempts to look beyond the homogenizing effect of classification
based on income, 95 and instead, it seeks to “put a face on America’s tax
returns.”96 Central to this undertaking is the recognition that “tax is political”97
and not merely a set of abstract economic principals.98
from daily matters. Crawford and Infanti, supra note 35, at xxii. Tax scholars, on the other hand,
were typically not trained in critical analysis, but favored economic analysis as the preferred lens
through which to evaluate tax law and policy. It took a new generation of tax scholars to apply the
lessons of critical theory to the byzantine world of taxation.
92
Although it is difficult to categorize the divergent voices of the critical tax scholars, they all
share a common understanding that “legal doctrine and legal institutions are contingent products
in an evolutionary process of social change.” BAUMAN, supra note 91, at 29. Speaking of the
larger field of critical studies, Bauman also remarks on the difficulty of categorization given the
“heterogeneity of the movement.” Id. at 3. In this way, the critical tax scholars can trace their roots
directly to the larger and earlier field of critical legal studies that rejects law’s neutrality and the
existence of determinative rules that produce objective and predictable adjudications. Id. at 33.
93
Critical tax scholarship focuses primarily on the federal personal income tax, although some
commentators have discussed the estate and gift tax, as well as the rules governing retirement
accounts and social security payroll taxes. See generally, Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk
Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity, and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 385 (2007) (addressing pensions); Staudt, supra note 27 (addressing social security wages).
94

Taking issue with a leading critic of critical tax theory on the question of objectivity, Marjorie
Kornhauser wrote:
[The critic’s] vision of detached and disinterested may be the empirical study
with its scientific approach, because science is frequently viewed as the ultimate
representative of Objective Truth in our culture . . . . To use only science, or
some other “detached and disinterested” technique, is to silence other
viewpoints behind a mask of unanimity and objectiveness. Not only is this
oppressive, but it denies everybody of the insights, knowledge, and possible
solutions that the alternative communities can provide.
Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1623-26.
95
See Infanti, supra note 21, at 1206 (noting the “homogenizing effect”).
96
TAX FOUNDATION, PUTTING A FACE ON AMERICA’S TAX RETURNS: A CHARTBOOK, (2012),
available at
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/putting_a_face_on_americas_tax_return
s_chartbook.pdf.
97
Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi. See Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1627 (“In the tax
world, this approach means that we must constantly be aware that the tax laws reflect social and
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Following the lead of critical legal studies, critical tax scholarship has
recognized the law as a complex social, political, and economic process—an act
of social construction that has unique constitutive powers.99 To put this insight in
a tax context, one of the most long-standing topics of tax scholarship has been the
quest for the ideal tax base.100 According to a critical perspective, however, the
tax base does not exist a priori. It cannot precede the law but rather, is a creation
of the law. When the tax law defines the tax base, it also constitutes the base. In
this way, society would not be said to choose an optimal tax base. Society
constitutes a tax base through the process of legislation, regulation, judicial
interpretation, compliance, and enforcement. 101
In rejecting blanket claims of neutrality, critical tax scholars have focused
instead on exploring the role tax laws play in the construction of social meaning
and exposing explicit and implicit bias in the tax code.102 Critical tax scholars
have also stressed the connection between taxation and broader questions of
social justice and progressive causes. 103 These scholars have taken a special
political choices, not just economic ones, and that all these choices have different impacts on
different groups.”).
98
Marjorie Kornhauser explains that “economic analysis has had a long tradition of obscuring the
normative underpinnings of economic theories of tax.” Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of
the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 486
(1987).
99
It is a complex social, political, and economic process. It is a social construction that has unique
constitutive power due to many factors, not the least of which is that law exists as the command of
the sovereign. Critical legal theory views the deployment of law as the exercise of constitutive
power such that “all legal reasoning involves the creation of meaning rather than the discovery of
meanings already present in such materials.” BAUMAN, supra note 91, at 33. Critical legal theory
openly challenged the once majestic notion that the rule of law existed as an autonomous entity,
separate from those who create it, interpret it, and are subject to it.
100
The theory of optimal tax policy was developed by economist James Mirrlees for the purpose
of determining how progressive an income tax should be if the system’s goal is maximization of
welfare. See Mirrlees, supra note 22.
101
From a critical point of view, any claim of tax exceptionalism—the notion that tax law is
different from general law must be attributed to (or illustrated by) something other than the
inherent nature of tax law. See Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truths, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2010) (responding to claims of tax exceptionalism resulting from the “inherent
fictions in tax law”).
102
See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the
Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV 1 (1994) (discussing the
role of the corporate charitable contribution deduction and the marketing advantage of the “halo
effect”).
103
Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi (noting that critical tax theory seeks “to educate
nontax scholars and lawyers about the interconnectedness of taxation, social justice, and
progressive social movements”). See also Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1609. (explaining that
“taxes also tell us more generally about our society since what we tax and how we tax reflect a
multitude of philosophical, social, and political choices”).
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interest in the numerous ways tax laws impact “traditionally disempowered
groups such as people of color; women of all colors; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender people; low-income and poor individuals; the disabled; and
nontraditional families.” 104 To this end, they have spent considerable time
discussing the more obviously gendered or otherwise exclusionary provisions of
the tax code such as the marital provisions,105 as well as the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the joint filing provisions.106 Critical tax scholars have also revealed
implicit bias by re-examining such seemingly neutral and arcane provisions as the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) paid to the working poor, 107 the marital
deduction QTIP under the federal estate and gift tax, 108 employer-provided
pension plans,109 and the so-called “Nanny Tax.”110 In each instance, critical tax
theorists have endeavored to illustrate how existing tax law and policy can
“reflect and even reify discrimination based on race, gender, sexual orientation,
class, disability or family structure.”111
The efforts of critical tax scholars to bring an outsider perspective to tax
policy and question the base premise of taxpayer neutrality have often been met
with stiff and sustained resistance from mainstream tax scholars who write
primarily from an economics or public welfare perspective.112 As a result, critical
104

Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi.
See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993). See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money,
and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 63
(1993) (critiquing the income pooling rationale of the joint filing provisions).
106
Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998).
105

The exclusion of same-sex couples from the marital provisions is intentional. As
a result, there is nothing hidden or covert about the heterosexist bias of the tax
code. There is no neutral principle at work. The rationale for the exclusion is not
that same-sex couples do not pool their resources like opposite-sex married
couples. Instead, the rationale for the exclusion is based on the beliefs that a
same-sex couple is not a family, that no civilized society has ever countenanced
such unions, and that our Judeo-Christian heritage forbids them.
Id. at 233.
107
See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790
(2007).
108
See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading
to Women, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 301 (1996).
109
See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity,
and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 385 (2007).
110
See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward a Global Critical Feminist Vision: Domestic Work and
the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1 (1999).
111
Infanti and Crawford, supra note 35, at xxi.
112
By 1998, critical tax writings had attracted sufficient attention that the North Carolina Law
Review dedicated a Symposium issue to critical tax theory—or more accurately, to a critique of
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tax theory has remained essentially a critique—a view from the margin that can
both inform and illuminate—but it has failed to find a wide audience among tax
scholars or application for its insights within tax policy. 113 From the outset,
critical tax scholarship was derided by mainstream tax scholars for being trendy,
divisive, and less than rigorous.114 Its authors were accused of selection bias115
and spreading conspiracy theories. 116 They were faulted for trying to find
critical tax theory. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 32; Dodge, supra note 32. The Symposium issues
also included works by critical tax scholars, many of whom expressed surprise that their work was
met with such resistance given that the observations of critical tax theory seemed “obvious.”
Beverly Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can We Ever Know Anything About Race and Tax?, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1629 (1998).
The thing that is the most surprising about this entire Symposium is that there is
a symposium at all. Many of the matters discussed in A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code and the other articles highlighted here are obvious. Our
tax system does more than tax revenues. It also tries to shape, punish, and
reward behaviors. The Code is subject to influence. Blacks and whites know
very little about one another, and whites essentially hold the power to tax. What
would make any one of us think that the Code would not have rules that favored
whites over blacks?
Id. at 1637.
113
See Michael A. Livingston, Women, Poverty, and the Tax Code: A Tale of Theory and
Practice, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 327, 330 (2002). Livingston explains, “Although many tax
scholars are more sympathetic, the largest numbers have simply ignored the critical tax endeavor,
leaving women’s and minorities’ concerns somewhat peripheral to the broader tax subject.” Id.
114
See Erik M. Jensen, Critical Theory and the Loneliness of the Tax Prof, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1753,
1770 (1998). Jensen argues that tax academics should be able to “evaluate the merits of legal
policy without using trendy (and divisive) language, conspiratorial theories, otherworldly
standards[.]” Id.
115
See Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1578 (asserting that “problems of one-sidedness and incomplete
analysis are more common in the critical tax literature than in the general academic tax policy
literature).”
116

See Dodge, supra note 32, at 1729 (noting that he had “some bones to pick with feminist
scholarship in this area, namely, its innuendos of a male chauvinist plot”). See also Knauer, supra
28, at 234 n. 517.
The recent commentary on critical tax scholarship has pointed disapprovingly to
a conspiracy stance, despite attempts to explain that no one thinks that the
members of Congress are staying up at night trying to devise ways to increase
the incidence of taxation on African Americans. In many ways, of course, the
systemic racism that can lead to the unremarkable nature of the provisions
outlined by Moran and Whitford is even more insidious and more difficult to
address than vocal racism.
Id.
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“hidden” discrimination. 117 In many instances, the opponents seemed to be
completely flummoxed by the clear lack of solutions offered by the critical tax
theorists.118 Some appeared vaguely insulted by the assertion that tax law would
necessarily reflect existing biases and existing inequities because in the
opponents’ view, tax law was no different from any other type of law. 119 In many
circles, critical tax scholarship was dismissed as “mere critique,” 120 and its
resulting policy interventions were labeled as “troubling” or “underdeveloped”—
or in some instances even “dangerous.”121
Much of the criticism directed at critical tax scholarship came from an
identity-blind position under which race, gender, and other identity characteristics
have no place in tax policy.122 Under an identity-blind paradigm, any suggestion
that tax policy should examine its impact on specific groups was criticized as an
117

Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1579 (reporting “the impression the authors set out on the sort of
search for hidden discrimination”). On the topic of “hidden discrimination,” Zelenak charged:
“[w]ithin the critical tax movement, there is a reward for examining a tax provision and finding it
guilty of hidden discrimination; there is no reward for discovering a provision is innocent.” Id. at
1578. For a response to this point, see Leo P. Martinez and Jennifer M. Martinez, The Internal
Revenue Code and Latino Realities: A Critical Perspective, 22 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 377,
387 (2011) (noting that “we persist in believing that highlighting racial inequities in the Code is a
useful task because exposing racial inequalities is the best avenue for promoting discourse with
respect to whether such inequalities can in fact be justified.”).
118
Marjorie Kornhauser responded directly to this criticism, noting:
[A]ll scholarship need not (and does not) produce solutions. Before a solution
can be found, a problem must be identified. Critical tax theory, like other
outsider theory, is especially good at identifying problems. A better solution
may not be possible; sometimes there is no way to solve one problem without
creating another. Yet critical tax theory’s different perspective is still useful . . . .
It will remind us, as we must be reminded, that our solutions are partial and
evolving.
Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 1626-27.
See Erik M. Jensen, supra note 114, at 1762 (“If racial subordination is really so pervasive that
it exists even when legislators are drafting facially neutral tax statutes, with the best of intentions,
what in the world are people of good will to do? Indeed, can there be any people of good will?”).
120
Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1524 (arguing that “mere critique without a workable solution does
nothing to better anyone's situation”). For a response see Nancy C. Staudt, Tax Theory And "Mere
Critique": A Reply To Professor Zelenak, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (1998) (referring to the
“single-minded focus on solutions” as “both ironic and bizarre”).
121
Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1532; 1560; 1571. See also id. at 1540 (stating that “an explicitly
sex-based system can only be a disaster . . . remarkable for its capacity to offend almost
everyone”).
122
See Galvin, supra note 67, at 1749. Galvin argued that “A tax system should be neutral in its
effect on each citizen’s decisionmaking. Therefore, assuming a democratic ideal of a free society
with equal opportunity for all, the framers of tax policy should strive for a system that is blind as
to gender and color.” Id.
119
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inappropriate form of special pleading that was directly contrary to the principle
of equity.123 Mainstream tax scholars warned that attempts to correct for implicit
bias in the tax code would give rise to a “nightmare of dilemmas” and produce
considerable discontent among taxpayers and policy makers. 124
When mainstream tax scholars engaged critical tax scholars on the merits, it
was mostly on the question of numbers. Mainstream tax scholars argued that
critical tax scholars had not proven that tax laws have a disparate impact on
marginalized groups, especially when viewed within the larger progressive rate
structure,125 or when taking into account other entitlement programs. They also
claimed that the continuing progressivity of the tax code evidenced an overriding
intent, as a matter of public policy, to benefit low-income taxpayers rather than to
penalize disadvantaged groups. 126 Accordingly, mainstream tax scholars argued
that any claims of bias were necessarily misplaced because the income tax, by its
very nature, served a broader redistributive goal.127
Despite this inauspicious reception, many of the insights of critical tax
theory now find support in international practices such as gender mainstreaming
and gender-sensitive budgeting.128 Moreover, the prime assertion of critical tax
theorists that tax is political has received widespread national attention in
connection with United States v. Windsor, the groundbreaking U.S. Supreme
Court case that challenged the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act
123

See Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1540 (asserting that “an explicitly sex-based system can only be
a disaster.”).
124
Galvin, supra note 67, at 1749 (“I agree with Professor Zelenak that any attempt to tailor the
system to meet the criticisms of feminists or racial groups rapidly becomes a nightmare of
dilemmas that are just not resolvable”). According to Galvin, “One needs only to observe
lifestyles of friends, colleagues, neighbors, and relatives, and one becomes keenly aware that to
design a tax regime to meet the gender and race considerations of each case would create a
statutory maze of confusion many times worse confounded than the current system.” Id.
125
See, e.g., Schmalbeck, supra note 36, at 1834.
126
Id. (“[T]he tax is progressive, which must greatly favor African-Americans in light of their
significantly lower average incomes . . . the progressivity of the tax system is a far more important
characteristic from an African-American viewpoint than are any of the characteristics Moran and
Whitford consider in their article.”).
127
See, e.g., James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Critics, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1687
(1998) (expressing incredulity at the attacks by women and African-Americans on the income tax,
which “[t]hroughout its history in the United States, . . . has been an instrument for redistributing
income”).
128

See generally UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10 (describing the relationship between gender
and taxation as a method to combat poverty). In addition, Cambridge University Press released a
comprehensive reader in critical tax theory in 2009 that recognizes the field as a “distinct mode of
inquiry.” INFANTI & CRAWFORD, supra note 35, at xxi. Critical tax theorists have also forged
connections with kindred spirits writing in other more progressive fields, such as law & sexuality
and family law.
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(DOMA).129 As it turns out, one of the most important civil rights cases of this
generation was a tax case involving the exclusion of same-sex married couples
from the marital deduction provisions under the federal estate tax.130
II.

CHOOSING A CRITICAL LENS

This section focuses on the choice and construction of a critical lens that
will enable policy makers to identify explicit and implicit bias within the tax
system, as well as inform how they exercise their discretion. As discussed in the
previous section, existing bias is often obscured by the misplaced belief in the
inherent neutrality of taxation. Thus, the first step in developing a critical lens is
to reject tax exceptionalism and recognize that sometimes it is necessary to go in
search of hidden bias in order to promote equity. Although consistent with the
recommendations of critical tax theory, this intuition regarding hidden bias is also
supported by an emerging international tax equity consensus that acknowledges
the important role taxation can play in re-enforcing existing disparities and
persistent inequality.131
The international consensus is primarily directed at questions of gender
equity. However, it is possible to imagine similar inquiries proceeding along any
number of identity axes, depending on the points of difference or inequality
deemed significant within a given country. 132 Accordingly, the second step in
developing a critical lens is identifying which significant differences or inequities
policy makers should consider, while simultaneously recognizing that they will
necessarily evolve and change over time. This section first discusses how to make
that determination. It then applies the critical lens to three instances of bias in the
tax code: one explicit, one implicit, and one resulting from an exercise of
interpretive discretion. In each case, the critical lens offers a mode of analysis that
challenges the myth of taxpayer neutrality, but it does not prescribe a specific
legislative or regulatory safeguard. The third and final step in developing a critical
lens is to create an enforcement mechanism. Part III proposes a potential range of
safeguards and auditing procedures that all draw on accepted institutional
129

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
See Adam Liptak & Peter Baker, Justices Cast Doubt on Benefits Ban in U.S. Marriage Law,
N.Y. TIMES (MAR. 27, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/us/supreme-court-defense-ofmarriage-act.html.
131
See generally UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10 (describing the relationship between gender
and taxation as a method to combat poverty).
132
See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a
Legislative Process Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (2009) (proposing a method to identify
society groups singled out for consideration). In connection with her proposal for a legislative
impact statement, Anita Krishnakumar sets forth a detailed procedure to identify a “red flag list”
of identity groups or characteristics. Id. at 27–29. She advocates the creation of a non-partisan
committee to select and periodically review the groups. Id. at 28–29.
130

230

Vol. 9.2]

Nancy J. Knaur

traditions and constraints: enhanced data collection, the creation of a diversity
expenditure budget, and the requirement that all major tax measures must be
accompanied by a diversity impact statement.
A. Identifying the Axes of Difference.
A core value of critical tax policy is the understanding that taxation is not
neutral. To the contrary, it often involves clear “winners and losers” that are
obscured by the construct of taxpayer neutrality—the assumption that the only
meaningful distinction among taxpayers is income level. 133 International
economists have shown numerous ways that taxation can interact with gender
norms and patterns of subordination to skew the incidence of taxation along
identity groups and thereby reinforce existing inequalities.134 Critical tax policy
urges policy makers to acknowledge and address the connection between taxation
and inequality by examining taxation through a critical lens, one which
foregrounds relevant identity characteristics and prompts policy makers to ask
difficult questions. By viewing taxation through this critical lens, policy makers
would be better able to evaluate the impact of a given tax structure on social
inequalities and determine what, if any, remedial measures would be are
necessary or desirable. Therefore, a critical lens makes taxpayer differences
visible and holds policy makers accountable for their choices.135
Although the majority of the international tax equity research has focused
on gender, there are numerous other identity characteristics or points of difference
that could also be relevant when evaluating tax policy for bias. Critical tax
theorists, writing from the vantage point of critical race studies, LatCrit, feminist
legal theory, disability studies, or queer theory, have explored many of these
characteristics and raised questions related to race, ethnicity, gender, disability,
sexual orientation, and gender identity.136 In an effort to illustrate the prevalence
of implicit bias in the tax code, several critical tax theorists have used the
heuristic of an ideal legislature comprised entirely of outsiders.137 They argued
133

See PERAP TAX REPORT , supra note 4.
See generally MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 1 (“There is a view that to deploy tax law for any
instrumental purpose somehow detracts from its purity and causes it to function less well as a
system of tax”). Mumford explains that “[t]he project of this book is to argue . . . that the tax
system should be deployed to militate against economic discrimination against women.” Id.
135
The adoption of a critical lens, therefore, also advances the interests of transparency and better
budgeting advocated by the tax expenditure concept. See SCHWABISH & GRIFFITH, supra note 55
(describing transparency gains).
136
See generally CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 11 (an anthology with
over fifty articles either written from a critical tax perspective or responding to it).
137
See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 294–97 (imaging a tax system designed and
implemented by women following an “ethic of care”); Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 78081 (describing a “Black Congress” and the tax changes it might recommend).
134
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that a “Black Congress” or a “legislator named Sue” would reflexively adopt a
critical lens when approaching issues of public policy and taxation.138 Although
this might be true, the question remains: What should be done in the case of a less
than ideal decision maker who does not come hardwired with a critical lens?
In the absence of an intuitive appreciation for the salience of difference, a
critical lens provides policy makers a prompt to consider distributional issues
across identity groups and consider identity characteristics that may be relevant
for tax policy purposes. This section is concerned mainly with the construction of
the lens, and Part III of this Article discusses various enforcement procedures and
safeguards to aid in the implementation of the critical lens. The adoption of a
critical lens will make certain taxpayer characteristics visible that were
intentionally obscured under the myth of taxpayer neutrality. Instead of simply
viewing taxpayers in income bands, a critical lens allows policy makers to
evaluate the actual incidence of tax broken down by membership in a particular
identity group.
Consistent with current federal policy, a critical lens for tax policy would
most likely include race, gender, and perhaps ethnicity and disability.139 In the
United States, there is wide agreement that the identity characteristics of race and
gender continue to carry significant social meaning that is weighted with
discrimination and bias.140 Federal, state, and local policies include robust antidiscrimination protections for race and gender; although, stronger protections
remain in place for race. 141 Federal policies also extend anti-discrimination
protections based on disability and age.142
With respect to other points of difference, such as sexual orientation or
gender identity, there are varying degrees of agreement at the federal level and

138

See Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 752 (noting that “it is likely that blacks rarely used
income averaging.”) Id. For example, Moran and Whitford note that “it is likely that blacks rarely
used income averaging.” Moran and Whitford, supra note 26, at 752. They reason that a “Black
Congress” would not bother to enact pro-taxpayer income averaging because a “Congress oriented
solely to the interests of blacks would never have perceived the original wrong that income
averaging was intended to cure.” Id. at 752–53.
139
For a discussion of the federal government and demographic data collection based on identity
group or characteristics, see infra text accompanying notes 221- 32.
140
See, e.g., Title VII, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000 (2012) (extending
protection in employment based on race and sex).
141
For example, classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny for equal protection
purposes, whereas classifications based on gender receive only heightened scrutiny.
142
See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (extending
federal anti-discrimination protections based on disability); The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012) (extending anti-discrimination in employment
on account of age).
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considerable variation among the states.143 Federal policy has not wholeheartedly
endorsed equal rights for individuals regardless of sexual orientation or gender
identity, although public support on both counts has increased significantly over
the last several years.144 As a result, sexual orientation and gender identity may
represent two points of difference that would be included looking forward. It is
also possible that there might be other groups who would warrant special attention
in terms of tax policy, such as veterans. 145
Once the critical lens is calibrated to capture the points of difference
deemed relevant to tax policy, it remains to be seen how it should be imposed.
Part III discusses three enforcement measures that would require legislative or
executive action. However, it is also possible to urge individual decision makers
to adopt a critical lens and invite them to look beyond the myth of taxpayer
neutrality. Legislators could then take this perspective with them into
deliberations, and agency officials could draw on it when issuing guidance. At its
most basic, a critical lens prescribes an appreciation for difference and the
continuing disparities that exist in terms of access to and participation in various
social, political, and economic benefits and activities. On an individual level, a
critical lens requires a degree of cultural competence and diversity awareness.146
143

Currently, federal protections do not exist in employment, housing, or public accommodations
on account of sexual orientation or gender identity. At the state level, there are seventeen states
and the District of Columbia that prohibit discrimination in employment based on sexual
orientation and gender identity. Four additional states prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation, but not gender identity. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS
& POLICIES, July 22, 2013, available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Employment_
Laws_and_Policies.pdf.
144
Peter Baker, Same-Sex Marriage Support Shows Pace of Social Change Accelerating, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/us/same-sex-marriage-support-showspace-of-social-change-accelerating.html?_r=0 (noting “the dizzying pace of social change”).
145
For example, veterans who are disabled or who serve on active duty during certain specified
times are entitled to hiring preferences for federal employment. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (2012). See
also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, VETERANS’ PREFERENCE OPERATIONS MANUAL (Apr. 22, 2010),
available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/vms/Volume%20XII/vp_ops_manual.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2013).
146
The Office of Minority Health, Department of Health and Human Services, uses the following
definition of “cultural competency”:
Cultural and linguistic competence is a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and
policies that come together in a system, agency, or among professionals that
enables effective work in cross-cultural situations. ‘Culture’ refers to integrated
patterns of human behavior that include the language, thoughts,
communications, actions, customs, beliefs, values, and institutions of racial,
ethnic, religious, or social groups. ‘Competence’ implies having the capacity to
function effectively as an individual and an organization within the context of
the cultural beliefs, behaviors, and needs presented by consumers and their
communities.
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Although cultural competency is a widely accepted professional norm in the fields
of health care, social work, education, and human relations, 147 it has found little
application beyond these largely service-oriented fields.148 Perhaps it is time to
urge our policy makers to evidence that same appreciation for difference and
ability to interact with individuals from diverse backgrounds that we expect from
our doctors, nurses, teachers, and HR directors.
Of course, some people will object to the idea of imposing a critical lens as
identity politics run amuck. For conservatives who oppose affirmative action and
support “racial privacy” laws, any attempt to analyze tax expenditures based on
race will look suspiciously like racial favoritism and the institutionalization of
entitlements.149 From a quite different point on the political spectrum, there are
others who might object on the grounds that the critical lens represents a step
backward at a time when we should be moving toward a public policy that
embraces post-identity politics.150 For the post-identity critic, the goal of public
policy should be to dismantle identity—not to introduce it into an area that
traditionally has been identity-free. Addressing this second point, it is important
to note that the proposal for a critical lens is not incompatible with aspirations for
a post-identity society. The critical lens recognizes that identity is a social
construction but also argues that in certain circumstances public policy should
continue to take these identity classifications into account. Where difference
remains marked by inequality, efforts to ignore the difference will simply leave
inequality.
B. Explicit and Implicit Bias in the Personal Income Tax
Any tax system can contain instances of both explicit and implicit bias.
Explicit bias should be easier to see because it refers to a tax provision that is
What Is Cultural Competency?, THE OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, available at
http://minorityhealth.hhs. gov/templates/browse.aspx?lvl=2&lvlID=11 (last visited Apr.
4, 2013) (internal citations omitted).
147
See, e.g., MARYANNE R. JEFFREYS, TEACHING CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN NURSING AND
HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 2010) (nursing); CULTURALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
UNDERSTANDING DIVERSE GROUPS AND JUSTICE ISSUES (Doman Lum, ed., 4th ed. 2011) (social
work); JEAN MOULE, CULTURAL COMPETENCE: A PRIMER FOR EDUCATORS (2d ed. 2012)
(education).
148
See, e.g., MARYANNE R. JEFFREYS, TEACHING CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN NURSING AND
HEALTH CARE (2d ed. 2010) (nursing); DOMAN LUM, CULTURALLY COMPETENT PRACTICE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING DIVERSE GROUPS AND JUSTICE ISSUES (Doman Lum, ed., 4th
ed. 2011) (social work); JEAN MOULE, CULTURAL COMPETENCE: A PRIMER FOR EDUCATORS (2d
ed. 2012) (education).
149
For a discussion of the “racial privacy” movement see infra text accompanying notes 242-48.
150
For a discussion of the multi-racial movement and the post-identity perspective see infra text
accompanying notes 232-44.
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outright discriminatory or exclusionary on its face. For example, in Morocco,
married taxpayers file individually, but all dependent allowances for children are
allocated to the husband, thereby reducing his effective rate of tax and denying
the wife the deduction.151 This practice represents an explicit preference based on
gender. When explicit bias is based on deeply embedded practices, however, it
may be difficult to recognize because it reflects an affirmative policy choice—it is
intentional. 152 In other words, a policymaker using a critical lens to identify
gender bias within a tax code may not find the fact that marital filing provisions
exclude same-sex partners to be remarkable because until recently the exclusion
of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage was taken as a given.153
As its name implies, implicit bias is not evident on the face of the tax
code. The myth of taxpayer neutrality makes it impossible for policy makers to
evaluate the incidence of taxation along identity group lines. Accordingly, tax
policy can lead to unintended consequences where the tax code ends up
reinforcing existing disparities or creating undesirable incentives. These
unintended consequences would qualify as implicit bias—the natural result of a
system where “tax legislation intersects with . . . relationships, norms, and
economic behavior.”155 An example of implicit gender bias would be where a tax
code privileges a certain type of economic behavior that is more often associated
with men.156
The critical lens adopted by policy makers should be sensitive to both
implicit and explicit bias, as well as instances where a discretionary interpretation
might reinforce or reflect existing inequalities. The three following examples deal
with each of these instances individually: explicit bias, implicit bias, and
discretionary bias. Each case involves either sexual orientation or gender identity,
recognizing that both identity characteristics are presently outside the traditional
groups recognized in federal policy.
154

151

See UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10, at 6. This is the default rule. Id. The wife may claim the
allowances if she can show that her husband and children are dependent on her earnings. Id.
152
The marital provisions and same-sex couples represents a clear example of intentional
exclusion in US tax policy. See Knauer, supra note 28, at 233.
153
This is an example of heteronormativity. Id. at 133 (defining heteronomativity as “the largely
unstated assumption that heterosexuality is the essential and elemental ordering principal of
society”). See also Chrys Ingraham, The Heterosexual Imaginary: Feminist Sociology and
Theories of Gender, in QUEER THEORY/SOCIOLOGY 169 (Steven Seidman ed., 1996) (defining
heteronormativity as “the view that institutionalized heterosexuality constitutes the standard for
legitimate and prescriptive sociosexual arrangements”).
154
See MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 3 (cautioning that the question of implicit bias “necessarily
involve subjective judgments about appropriate economic behaviour”).
155
UNDP, Issues Brief, supra note 10, at 4.
156
Id.
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1. Explicit bias – the marital filing provisions
Anyone looking for explicit bias in the tax code directed toward LGBT
taxpayers need go no farther than Section 1 where the tax tables establish a
different and, in many instances, more favorable rate structure for married
taxpayers.157 The struggle for marriage equality in the United States has largely
proceeded on a state-by-state basis.158 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia
currently recognize same-sex marriage.159 An additional seven states extend all
the equivalent rights and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples but call the
resulting status by another name, such as civil union or domestic partnership.160
Despite these gains, the vast majority of states continue to have laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage.161
Until recently, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) mandated that for all
federal purposes marriage was restricted to “a union between one man and one
woman.” 162 As a result, a same-sex couple who was married and lived in a
157

IRC § 1(a);(c).
Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec.
10, 2012), available at
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited
July 25, 2013).
159
In addition to the District of Columbia, the thirteen states are: California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Vermont, and Washington. Id.
160
The seven states with a status equivalent to marriage are: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, New
Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Id.
161
Thirty-one states have laws prohibiting marriage equality or have amended their state
constitutions to prohibit marriage equality. Some states have both statutory and constitutional
prohibitions. Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws , HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, available at
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/ resources/marriageprohibitions_6-10-2014.pdf. The following twenty-eight states have constitutional amendments
prohibiting marriage equality: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. Nineteen of these states have very aggressive
anti-marriage laws that ban not only marriage equality, but also the grant of any of the so-called
“incidents of marriage.” Id. The states with these “super DOMAs” are: Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. In addition to
the twenty-nine states with constitutional amendments, the following six states prohibit same-sex
marriage by statue: Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
162
Enacted in 1996, DOMA provides that for all federal purposes marriage is only between one
man and one woman. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996),
codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7.

158

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation,
or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
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jurisdiction that recognized same-sex marriage was nonetheless considered
“unmarried” for federal tax purposes.163 The 2013 United States Supreme Court
case, U.S. v. Windsor, successfully challenged the section of DOMA that defined
marriage at the federal level.164 The case involved a surviving spouse who was
required to pay $363,000 in additional estate tax on the death of her spouse
because their marriage was not recognized for federal tax purposes, even though it
was recognized by their state of domicile. 165 As noted earlier, the widespread
public interest surrounding the Windsor case illustrates a core intuition of critical
tax policy, namely that “tax is political.”166
As long as DOMA was in force, the married same-sex couples who lived in
the jurisdictions that recognize marriage equality were not considered married for
federal tax purposes.167 However, even after the definitional section of DOMA
was declared unconstitutional, it remained unclear whether married same-sex
taxpayers who reside in the non-marriage states would be considered married
under the traditional domicile rule that pre-dated DOMA. 168 Under that rule,

United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Id.
163

The income tax rates are married, head of household, unmarried, and married filing separately.
IRC § 1 (a)-(d).
164
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013). U.S. v. Windsor only challenged
section 3 of DOMA, which provides the definitional section quoted above. Defense of Marriage
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7. Section 2 of DOMA purports to allow states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages performed in sister states. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738C.
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
Id.
165

Edith Windsor married her long-time partner, Thea Spyer in Canada in 2007. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. at 2689. At the time of Thea’s death in 2009, the couple lived in New York, and New York
recognized their marriage. Id.
166
Id.
167
See Kornhauser, supra note 65 (discussing the assertion that “tax is political”).
168
See Estate of Steffke v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 538 F.2d 730, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 429 U.S. 1022
(1976) (decedent’s spouse remained married to her first husband as a result of an invalid Mexican
divorce); see also Estate of Goldwater v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.
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taxpayers are considered married for federal tax purposes if they are legally
married in their state of domicile. 169 Ultimately, the Internal Revenue Service
declined to follow the more narrow “state of domicile” rule in favor of a more
expansive “state of celebration” rule, which recognizes all legally married samesex couples.170
Since Windsor, the Internal Revenue Service has also taken the position that
same-sex couples who have entered into equivalent status relationships, such as
civil unions or domestic partnerships, are not considered married for federal tax
purposes nor are the same-sex couples who live in non-recognition states and
cannot travel to marry in another state. 171 Accordingly, despite the favorable
result in Windsor, the marital provisions in the federal tax code will likely
continue to exclude some same-sex couples until all states recognize same-sex
marriage.172
The absence of formal equality for same-sex couples under the tax code has
been a frequent topic in critical tax scholarship.173 It has also served as a point of
departure for larger discussions involving the marital provisions that run
throughout both the income tax and the estate and gift tax. When viewed in their
totality, the marital provisions can be somewhat confusing, especially when
attempting to measure their impact on the income tax liability of same-sex
couples. The reason for the confusion is that the marital provisions do not
necessarily produce a net benefit for all married couples.174 With respect to the

1976), cert. denied sub nom. Lipkowitz v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976)
(decedent remained married to first spouse because Mexican divorce was invalid).
169
IRC §7703(a)(1). With respect to marriage, the IRC provides rules regarding the timing of
marriage but not regarding the substantive question of when a marriage is valid. An individual is
considered married during a given tax year provided the individual is married on the last day of
the taxable year. Id.
170
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-13-17.pdf (last visited Sept.
11, 2013).
171
Id. In addition, some states, such as Wisconsin, prohibit couples from going out of state to
secure a marriage that would violate the laws of their domicile. 12 WISC. STAT. § 765.04 (2013).
In Wisconsin, the marriage is void and the couple is subject to criminal prosecution, with penalties
of a fine up to $10,000 and up to nine months in prison. 12 WISC. STAT. § 765.30 (2013).
172
The Windsor case did not mandate same-sex marriage nation-wide. It only challenged the
constitutionality of DOMA. United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). The case that
had the potential to mandate same-sex marriage nationwide was Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013).
173
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Domestic Partner Benefits, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 481
(2010); Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2004); Patricia A.
Cain, Federal Tax Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 387 (2002); Patricia A. Cain,
Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677 (2000); Patricia A. Cain,
Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 471 (1997).
174
Knauer, supra note 28, at 133-34.
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personal income tax, the effect of the married-filing-jointly rate schedule on a
couple’s income tax liability before and after marriage will depend on the
distribution of earnings within the couple.175 If both partners are relatively equal
earners, then the couple might actually experience a net increase in their tax
liability when they marry.176 This effect is the so-called “marriage penalty.”177 On
the other hand, if the partners earn disparate amounts, they will likely receive a
“marriage bonus” when they marry.178
Given that it is not always clear when the tax code will benefit marriage or
when it will penalize marriage, many mainstream tax scholars openly dismissed
the work of the critical tax scholars who were writing in this area because they
could not definitively demonstrate that same-sex couples would be better off
financially under a joint filing regime. 179 These objections reveal a telling
disconnect between the two groups. Whereas the mainstream tax scholars
interpret being “better off” as necessarily paying less tax, the critical tax scholars
were more concerned with questions of formal equality. They advocated for the
inclusion of same-sex couples in the marital provisions—for better or worse.180

Not all couples see their federal income tax liability increase upon marriage. In
fact, many more see it decrease, experiencing a marriage tax bonus. When
viewed in their entirety, the seemingly discordant rules offer a composite picture
of marriage. The rules reflect, for better or worse, a view of marriage as an
economic unit, a fundamental unit of society, and an intimate association whose
members may not deal with each other at arm’s length.
Id.
175

MCCAFFERY, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the importance of the distribution of earnings
within a couple).
176
Id. at 17 (describing the extent of the “marriage bonus”).
177
Id. at 19 (explaining that the “marriage penalty” is really a “secondary-earner penalty”).
178
Id. at 16 (referring to these couples as the “Traditionals”).
179
For example, Steve Johnson argued that tax scholarship addressing same-sex couples should
not advance proposals for reform until it “convincingly demonstrates that, on net, the failure to
recognize same-sex couples as married hurts them by imposing substantially higher federal
income tax liabilities on them.” Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: Critical Tax
Studies and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N. C. L. REV. 1771, 1179 (1998). He notes that unless
scholars first answer the distributive question, any reforms designed to help same-sex couples
could end up benefitting them doubly. See id. at 1774. If including same-sex couple would result
in “special rights,” Johnson reasons that scholarly “interested in equality” would have to consider
“how to reform the Code detrimentally to same-sex couples . . . not how to reform it beneficially
to them.” Id.
180
Tony Infanti responded directly to Johnson’s objections. Infanti, supra note 28, at 765. He
wrote:
As a gay man, I was puzzled at how equal treatment could be boiled down to a
simple cost-benefit analysis. How could Johnson have ignored the ways in
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For critical tax scholars who view taxation as political, it was easy to see the
non-recognition of same-sex marriages and partnerships as an infringement on the
right to full participation in civil society—regardless of the net financial
impact.181 Under this view, taxation is more than a simple calculation of tax due.
The income tax system represents the primary way that individuals interact with
the federal government. Despite how much Americans might like to complain
about paying taxes, the United States has one of the highest tax compliance rates
for any nation in the world. Americans are trained to report each year to the
federal government, their gains and losses—both financially and personally.
Taxpayers report whether they sold or bought a house, whether they were married
or divorced, whether they had a child, and whether their spouse died.
Working from this more expansive view of taxation, critical tax scholars
argued that the preoccupation with whether same-sex couples were financially
disadvantaged by individual filing missed the point. The objection was primarily
one of exclusion—of remedying a point of explicit bias. Under DOMA, same-sex
couples who were legally married in their state of residence had to file jointly for
state income tax purposes but then disaggregate their income and expenses in
order to file their federal income taxes individually. For their federal taxes, they
had to use the “unmarried” tax schedule and then sign their individual returns
under penalties of perjury. In some instances, same-sex couples may get a benefit
from being required to file individually, but in other cases there will be a penalty.
Edith Windsor, for example, had to pay $363,000 in additional federal estate tax
because the IRS would not recognize her marriage to her long-time partner and
wife. In either case, the principle of exclusion remains—an example of explicit
bias that “has no effect, other than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays
and lesbians . . . and to officially reclassify their relationships and families as
inferior to those of opposite-sex couples.”182
2. Implicit bias – “qualifying child”

which the Code stigmatizes gays and lesbians and attempts to force them into
the closet? Can any net tax benefit really make up for the patently unequal and
discriminatory treatment visited by the federal government upon gays and
lesbians through the medium of the Code? Put another way, can my recognition
as a full member of society be bought at the cheap price of an exemption from
the marriage penalty and from the various attribution and loss disallowance rules
that apply to married couples?
Id.
181
182

Id. (weighing “the cheap price of an exemption from the marriage penalty” with equality)
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012).
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The federal income tax provides a number of benefits for taxpayers who are
raising children, including dependency exemptions, child credits, the favorable
head of household filing status, 183 and dependent care credits. 184 In 2004, the
varying definitions of “child” for all of these provisions were coordinated under
the single definition of a “qualifying child.”185 The definition is very expansive
and includes many relationships that would not be respected for probate purposes,
such as “stepchildren” and “foster children.” 186 Notwithstanding its expansive
nature, it does not take into account the more than one million children who are
being raised in the United States by same-sex couples, many of whom live in
states where the non-biological parent or non-adoptive parent is unable to
formalize his or her relationship with the child.187 This exclusion is not the result
of DOMA, but rather an unintended consequence that could have been avoided
(or openly acknowledged) if the provision had been drafted through a critical lens.
183

Taxpayers who qualify as a head of household, as defined under section 2 of the Internal
Revenue Code, are eligible for an increased standard deduction and favorable tax rates. An
unmarried taxpayer is eligible for head of household filing status only when the taxpayer
maintains a household for at least one other qualifying relative. A same-sex partner cannot quality
as a “qualifying relative.” I.R.C. § 2 (2006).
184
Taxpayers are also entitled to a generous per child tax credit. I.R.C. § 24. (2006). The child
must be under the age of 17. I.R.C. § 24(c)(1). The maximum credit is $1000 for each child, and it
is phased out for higher income taxpayers. I.R.C. § 24(b)(1)-(2).
185
The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (“WFTRA”) sets a uniform definition of a
qualifying child. Prior to the WFTRA, the definition of a qualifying child was not consistent
throughout the Internal Revenue Code, and there were competing definitions in effect for purposes
of dependency exemption, the child credit, the dependent care credit, the favorable head of
household filing status, and the EITC. The lack of uniformity created considerable confusion on
the part of taxpayers, and the new definition was considered a significant gain in terms of
simplicity. The chair of the ABA Section of Taxation wrote to members of the House Ways and
Means Committee to praise them for taking “an important and concrete step toward
simplification.” Letter from Kenneth W. Gideon, Chair of the ABA Section of Taxation, to
members of the House Comm. on Ways & Means and Senate Comm. on Fin. (Oct. 18, 2004),
available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2004/041018hr1308.
authcheckdam.pdf. The letter noted that simplification measures such as this were “critically
important for an effective federal tax system.” Id.
186
I.R.C. § 152(f)(1) (2006).
187
Doris Nhna, Same-Sex Couples: U.S. Demographic Snapshot, NATIONAL JOURNAL (June 18,
2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/statistics/same-sex-parents-u-sdemographic-snapshot-20120618 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (estimating number of children);
Parenting Laws: Second Parent or Stepparent Adoption, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Aug. 2,
2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_second-parent-adoption_082013.pdf. In
jurisdictions where second parent adoption is not available, non-biological co-parents are at a
distinct disadvantage and the child is denied the security of having two legally recognized parents.
A second-parent adoption allows a second parent to adopt a child without the “first parent” losing
any parental rights. In this way, the child comes to have two legal parents. The effect of the
adoption is to grant the non-biological parent equal rights in custody and visitation matters.
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Separate and distinct from whether a child’s same-sex parents are
considered married for federal tax purposes, the uniform definition of “qualifying
child” precludes a non-biological parent from claiming a number of tax benefits
available to taxpayers with “qualifying children,”188 if the parent lives in one of
the eight states that does not allow second parent adoption. 189 Although the
uniform definition of “qualifying child” was intended to be expansive, LGBT
families living in these states will be ineligible to claim tax benefits that are
designed to help taxpayers maximize the resources that are available for their
children. These tax benefits, such as the EITC, are especially targeted to lower
income, working families.190
In an effort to reflect economic reality and the changing face of the
American family, the uniform definition of “qualifying child” adopts a functional
view of family, rather than the overly formal iterations of family often reflected in
the probate code and other laws.191 Despite the broad reach of the statute, it is
clear from IRS guidance that the definition of “qualifying child” does not extend
to a non-biological child whom the taxpayer is co-parenting without some other
indicia of relationship. 192 In the absence of a statutorily approved relationship
marker, a non-biological co-parent is merely acting in loco parentis and the child
188

I.R.C. § 152(c). A child may count as a “qualifying child,” if the child is the taxpayer’s: child,
stepchild, foster child, sibling, stepsibling, or descendant of any of the above. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1).
An adopted child is considered a “child,” and includes a child who has been “placed with the
taxpayer for legal adoption by the taxpayer.” I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(b).
189
Parenting Laws, supra note 187. In twenty-one states, second-parent adoption is available to
same-sex couples state wide. Id. Eight states have obstacles to second-parent adoption for samesex couples and the availability of second-parent adoption is unclear in the remaining states. Id.
190
President George W. Bush signed the “qualifying child” legislation when he was on the
campaign trail in Des Moines, Iowa. George W. Bush, President of the United States, Remarks on
Signing the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 in Des Moines, Iowa (Oct. 4, 2004),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72771#a xzz1Y3IXzJAD. During his remarks,
President Bush singled out the Hintz family in Clive, Iowa for special mention. President Bush
noted that the parents, Mike and Sharla, were frugal and always thought carefully about purchases
and priorities for their four children. Id. Needless to say, President Bush did not he realize that he
was holding up a youth pastor who had plead no contest to a charge of sexual exploitation brought
by a counselor. Michael Hintz, Ex-Omaha Pastor Charged in Iowa, WOWT NEWS (Dec. 8, 2004,
7:51 PM), http://www.wowt.com/ home/headlines/1137247.html.
191
In order to count as a “qualifying child,” the child must satisfy four tests: (1) relationship; (2)
age; (3) residency; and (4) support. I.R.C. § 152(c). The relationship test is the most relevant for
purposes of this discussion. It provides that the child must be the taxpayer’s son, daughter, brother,
sister, step-brother, step-sister, or a descendant of any such individual. I.R.C. § 152(c)(2). An
individual legally adopted by the taxpayer, or an individual who is lawfully placed with the
taxpayer by an authorized placement agency for legal adoption by the taxpayer, is treated as a
child of the taxpayer by blood. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(b). A foster child who is placed with the
taxpayer by an authorized placement agency or by judgment, decree, or other order of any court of
competent jurisdiction is treated as the taxpayer’s child. I.R.C. § 152(f)(1)(c).
192
I.R.C. § 152(c).
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does not qualify.193 In the case of a taxpayer who is co-parenting in a state that
does not allow second-parent adoption, the inability to claim the child as a
“qualifying child” for purposes of the child credit, the head of household filing
status, or the EITC can have significant tax consequences, especially if the nonbiological parent is the primary wage earner.194
If the uniform definition of “qualifying child” had been considered
through a critical lens that took into account the effect of the provision on
minority populations, marginalized groups, and the diversity of the families, it
would have been possible to see the disparate impact that the definition would
have on the children being raised by same-sex couples in states without second
parent adoption. Assuming this disparate impact was undesirable, the problem
could have been fixed through a slight modification in the statutory language
recognizing a biological or adoptive parent’s partner.195 Even after the enactment,
a comprehensive regulatory review conducted through a critical lens would catch
the same problem, and the situation could easily be remedied through
administrative action.196
3. Interpretive discretion – medical treatment
In 2006, the IRS disallowed Rhiannon O’Donnabhain’s medical expense
deduction for hormone treatment, sex-reassignment surgery, and breast
193

See Internal Revenue Serv., Publication 501: Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing
Information (2012). Note this would not affect two unmarried co-habitants if they were both the
parents of the child. In that case, both parents qualify and the parent with the higher income can
claim the child.
194
The inequities created under the uniform definition of a “qualifying child” have the effect of
penalizing families who choose to have one parent in the work force and the other caring for the
children full-time. It further disadvantages couples and their children by limiting the choice of
which parent will be a full-time caregiver. Although similarly situated married couples may
choose which parent will fulfill that role without consequence, same-sex couples, as well as other
unmarried couples, face negative tax consequences for the same decision. I.R.C. § 152(c).
195
It is clear that a dependent same-sex partner does not count as a “qualifying relative” for
purposes of qualifying for the favorable head of household filing status. As a result, the higher
income partner will not qualify for head of household filing status solely on account of a
financially dependent partner. However, the higher income partner can qualify if there is also a
“qualifying child” in the household. A child will satisfy the relationship test if the child is a
biological child, or an adoptive child, a stepchild, or even a foster child, but not if the child is the
child of the taxpayer’s partner. I.R.C. § 152(c)(2).
196
The Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) is currently considering adopting an expansive
definition of child that would include non-biological children who are being co-parented by samesex parents for purposes of federal employees health insurance. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT.,
GUIDE TO ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE PROGRAMS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, 10 n.80 (July
2012), available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/worklife/ referencematerials/adoption-benefits-guide-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).
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reconstruction surgery on the grounds that the treatment and surgery were
“cosmetic” and did not qualify as “medical treatment” within the meaning of the
statute. 197 , 198 The determination of whether the expenses qualified for the
deduction depended on how the IRS chose to interpret the Code and Regulations
in light of Ms. O’Donnabhain’s particular circumstances. There were no statutory
or regulatory provisions expressly dealing with medical treatment and transgender
taxpayers. At the time, there was also no IRS Guidance that addressed the
issue. 199 Despite reports that similar medical expense deductions had been
allowed in the past on an ad hoc basis, it was by all accounts a case of first
impression.200
Unlike the immediately preceding examples involving the marital
provisions and the definition of “qualifying child,” the denial of Ms.
O’Donnabhain’s tax deduction was not an instance of explicit or implicit bias.
Instead, it provides an example of how cultural competency on the part of IRS
officials is crucial to a fair and equitable administration of the tax laws. The
denial of the deduction was based on shockingly outmoded and uninformed views
of gender identity, and it was roundly criticized by medical experts, as well as by
LGBT advocacy organizations.201 If the officials reviewing Ms. O’Donnabhain’s
197

Taxpayers are allowed a deduction for medical expenses paid during the taxable year that are
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent
of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213 (2006). The statute specially provides that “cosmetic
surgery” does not quality as “medical care.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(9). Cosmetic surgery is defined as
“any procedure which is directed at improving the patient's appearance and does not meaningfully
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.” I.R.C. §
213(d)(9)(b). Cosmetic surgery does not include a “surgery or procedure [which] is necessary to
ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal
injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(a).
198
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 134 (2010).
199
The IRS acquiesced after the Tax Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer on two out of the three
expenses she sought to deduct. Internal Revenue Serv., Action on Decision, IRB 2011-47 (Nov.
21, 2011).
200
See Paul Caron, Tax Court to Decide Deductibility of Sex-Change Operation, TAXPROFBLOG
(July 18, 2007), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2007/07/deductibility-o.html (noting a
1983 case where father deducted travel costs related to son’s gender reassignment).
201
For example, Dr. Marshall Forstein, an associate professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical
School remarked, “It’s absolutely clear that transgender identity is a condition discussed in
diagnostic manuals. It seems the IRS is now in the business of practicing medicine without a
license." Anthony Faiola, Woman Suing IRS Over Sex-Change Tax Claims, Oct. 7, 2007, WASH.
POST (Oct. 7, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001194.html. Gender Identity Disorder is a stabled
medical disorder described under section 302.85 of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders-IV, the authoritative handbook used for the diagnosis of mental disorders. AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS-IV 537-38
(4th ed. 1994). Despite this widespread level of recognition, the Internal Revenue Service
described the medical treatment as “controversial.” See infra note 210.
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2001 tax return had employed a critical lens that included gender identity, the
dispute could have been avoided.202
Shortly after she received her refund check, Ms. O’Donnabhain was
notified that her income tax return was being audited.203 When the audit examiner
disallowed her medical expense deduction on the grounds that it was “cosmetic”
in nature, Ms. O’Donnabhain requested reconsideration by the regional IRS
Appeals Office.204 The appeals officer then requested and received advice from
the Chief Counsel’s Office of the IRS that affirmed the denial of the deduction,
representing the final decision by the IRS. 205 The Chief Counsel’s Advice
Memorandum (CCA) rested its decision on the bare assertion that “whether
gender reassignment surgery is a treatment for an illness or a disease is
controversial.” 206 This statement is directly at odds with the great weight of
medical opinion on the subject, which was not addressed in the CCA. Even more
disturbing, however, was that the source cited in support of the statement was an
article from a religious blog. 207 Indeed, the article from the blog was the only
202

Although not possible to measure the emotional costs to Ms. O’Donnabhain, it may be worth
noting that the Tax Court awarded her attorneys’ fees. Ed Whelan, Obama IRS’s $250,000
Giveaway to GLAD, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, (Dec. 1, 2010) http://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/254261/obama-irs-s-250000-giveaway-glad-ed-whelan (noting O’Donnabhain’s attorneys
were awarded $250,000 in costs by agreement of the parties).
203
Faiola, supra note 201 (describing the taxpayer as “a former construction engineer from a
devout Irish Catholic family in Boston”).
204
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
205
Internal Revenue Serv., Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum, 200603025 (Oct. 14, 2005). The
Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum (CCA) states, “Whether gender reassignment surgery is a
treatment for an illness or disease is controversial.” Id. It continues: “For instance, Johns Hopkins
Hospital has closed its gender reassignment clinic and ceased performing these operations.” In
support for these propositions, the CCA cited to First Things, which is “an interreligious,
nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is to advance a religiously informed
public philosophy for the ordering of society.” Masthead, FIRST THINGS,
http://www.firstthings.com/masthead (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). The citation used to support the
disallowance was to the following article currently available in the archive section of the website
maintained by First Things: Paul McHugh, Surgical Sex, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2004)
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2009/02/surgical-sex--35 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). On
March 29, 2013, the advertisements that framed the article included one for the DVD boxed-set
“Catholicism” and another for the Sacred Heart Major Seminary that was looking for a “candidate
for Old Testament and Biblical Languages.” Id. After citing the blog post, the CCA concluded: “In
light of the Congressional emphasis on denying a deduction for procedures relating to appearance
in all but a few circumstances and the controversy surrounding whether GRS is a treatment for an
illness or disease, the materials submitted do not support a deduction.” Chief Counsel Advice
Memorandum 200603025. The CCA found that the deduction could not be allowed in the absence
of an “unequivocal expression of Congressional intent that expenses of this type qualify under
section 213.” Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
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authority cited in the CCA to support its conclusion that medical treatment for
gender identity disorder is “controversial.”208
Ms. O’Donnabhain appealed to the Tax Court, where the court ultimately
allowed the deduction for hormone treatment and sex-reassignment surgery, but
disallowed the deduction for breast reconstruction on the grounds that it was
“cosmetic.”209 The IRS acquiesced the following year.210 The Tax Court decision,
however, was not unanimous, and some of the concurring and dissenting judges
openly expressed their discomfort with the fact of Ms. O’Donnabhain’s particular
point of difference. 211 In his concurrence, Judge Holmes bristled at the “crash
course on transsexualism that this case has forced on us.”212 He also faulted the
majority opinion, saying that it “drafts our Court into culture wars in which tax
lawyers have heretofore claimed noncombatant status.”213
The discontent expressed by the judges on the Tax Court suggests that the
imposition of a critical lens will not be without critics. However, this resistance
also illustrates why cultural competency is so necessary in the context of
discretionary decision making. At each juncture along the way—audit, appeals,
Chief Counsel’s Office, and the Tax Court—Ms. O’Donnabhain was forced to
explain her difference and why it mattered.
III.

DESIGNING CRITICAL TOOLS

As discussed in Part II, applying a critical lens to tax policy involves three
steps. First, it is necessary to refute the myth of taxpayer neutrality. Second, it is
essential to establish which identity characteristics are relevant, recognizing that
208

By choosing to rely on outmoded and discredited medical research, the CCA rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that the surgery was medically necessary to treat a condition listed in the
Diagnostic & Statistical Manual IV and that surgical intervention is a medically accepted standard
of care.
209
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r., 134 T.C. 34, 70, 72-73 (2010). The majority disallowed the
deduction for breast augmentation surgery on the grounds that it was cosmetic surgery. IRC §
213(d)(9). Amounts paid by taxpayers for breast reconstruction surgery following mastectomy for
cancer, as well as for vision correction surgery, are considered deductible medical care expenses.
Id. at 90-91. The IRS has also allowed a medical expense deduction for the cost of a hair
transplant for 24 year old who suffered from premature baldness. See Mattes v. Comm’r., 77 TC
650 (1981).
210
O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r., 134 T.C. 34 (2010), action on dec., 2011-47 I.R.B. (Nov. 21,
2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-aod/aod201103.pdf.
211
See Anthony C. Infanti, Dissecting O’Donnabhain, TAX NOTES, Mar. 15, 2010, at 1403, 1404–
05 (concluding that “it will be difficult for LGBT taxpayers to walk away from reading these
opinions harboring any hope that they will get a hearing in the Tax Court that is unaffected by
their sexual orientation or gender identity”).
212
O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 86 (Holmes, J., concurring).
213
Id. at 85.
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the different classes of characteristics will necessarily change and evolve over
time. Third, it is important to consider the procedural and more practical aspects
of how the critical lens should be administered or even enforced—to ask where it
fits in the policymaking process. Is it simply an auditing procedure that will
evaluate whether remedial steps are desirable when bias is identified in the tax
system? Or is it a process that can be included at the outset to avoid a situation
such as the under-inclusive uniform definition of a “qualifying child?” What
about the exercise of agency discretion that was so hopelessly misinformed in
O'Donnabhain? Can a constructive critical lens be imposed on all agency action?
This Part discusses these thorny procedural issues and proposes three
different measures, all of which are based on existing legislative and
administrative institutional traditions and procedures. These measures are: (1)
enhanced information collection; (2) the creation of a diversity expenditure
budget; and (3) the requirement of diversity impact statements. Although the
diversity expenditure budget and the diversity impact statement are separate
proposals that could be adopted independently, the enhanced information
collection is the necessary first step in this process. Without adequate data, it will
continue to be impossible to construct models to measure the impact of taxation
on inequality in the United States.
One of the earliest detractors of critical tax theory, Larry Zelenak, famously
complained that “mere critique without a workable solution does nothing to better
anyone’s situation.” 214 Although his characterization of critical tax theory as
“mere critique” misapprehends the nature of critical theory, his emphasis on a
workable solution is worth repeating. Each of the proposals described below
carries with it certain negative externalities that range from reifying artificially
constructed categories of race to placing additional costs on an already
cumbersome rulemaking process. They are only designed to be the starting point
of a larger conversation—a point of departure for future study and debate. They
represent logical solutions based on existing institutional patterns and practices. If
they are not feasible to implement because the political will is lacking or the cost
is too great, then those choices should be acknowledged rather than justified
under the mantel of taxpayer neutrality.
A. Good Policy Requires Good Data
Simply put, good policy requires good data. Critical tax policy requires
enhanced data collection that will allow policymakers to evaluate and measure the
impact of taxation on existing disparities by reference to identity group
classifications. The IRS currently does not collect demographic data such as race,
214

Zelenak, supra note 32, at 1524 (emphasis added). For a response, see Staudt, supra note 120,
at 1581 (referring to Zelenak’s “single-minded focus on solutions” as “both ironic and bizarre”).
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ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. 215 Although various
census initiatives capture some of this information, it is not cross-referenced with
federal income tax records.216 Social Security records provide another source of
demographic information, but they are also not cross-referenced with tax files.217
As a result, the information necessary to engage in a critical analysis of the tax
code is currently not available.
There are several possible ways to remedy this situation. The most
straightforward would be to allow taxpayers to provide identifying characteristics
on their tax returns. The IRS would then be able to code tax returns for
demographic characteristics and produce a statistical analysis of tax burdens and
benefits based on race, ethnicity, or whatever characteristics it chooses to query. It
would also be possible to collect tax information through the Census or crossreference tax and census data or tax and social security data. 218 There are
numerous objections to each method given the growing debate over the
desirability of the collection of public racial and ethnic information by
government entities, but a full discussion of the most effective way to collect data
is well outside the scope of this article.219
215

The U.S. Individual Income Tax Return only inquires regarding two very specific points of
disability and age: whether the taxpayer is 65 years of age or older and whether the taxpayer is
blind. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return Form 1040, OMB No. 1545-0074, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf.
Both of these points are necessary to determine whether the taxpayer is entitled to a higher
standard deduction. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Guide for Seniors, Publication 554, ch. 4
(2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p554/ch04.html.
216
See Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 757-58. Moran and Whitford engaged in their own
statistical analysis to determine the impact of the tax code on black taxpayers. They “analyzed data
about lifestyle differences using race and income alone as relevant categories.” They also analyzed
and reported about “black/white lifestyle differences after controlling for a limited number of
additional characteristics of SES [socioeconomic status].” Id.
217
See Moran, supra note 38, at 1633. Moran notes:
However, a study that measures compliance in addition to tax liability requires
either race-coded returns or sophisticated taxpayer surveys. Tax returns are not
race-coded and there are no compliance studies by race that address the
questions we raise in A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code. Although
tax returns are not coded by race, they can be cross-matched by race through
Social Security numbers. However, cross-matching against Social Security
numbers requires security clearance.
Id.
218

Id. (discussing “sophisticated taxpayer surveys”).
See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Briefing on the Consequences of Government Data
Race Collection Bans on Civil Rights, May 17, 2002, available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/ civrightsbrief51702.pdf (last visited
Apr. 5, 2013).
219
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1. Taxpayer neutrality and the collection of demographic data

The failure to capture demographic information reflects the strong
commitment to taxpayer neutrality that was discussed in greater detail in Part I.
When combined with the bounded nature of tax policy, the commitment to
taxpayer neutrality creates an impenetrable tautology where the only significant
distinguishing feature among taxpayers is income level and, because of that,
income level is the only distinguishing characteristic that the IRS collects and
analyzes. Many of the criticisms of critical tax theory exploited this tautology,
arguing that critical tax scholars could not make broad based evaluative
statements without reliable data. 220 The criticism, however, merely highlights the
Catch-22 created by the blanket assumption of taxpayer neutrality. If the only
salient distinction among taxpayers is income level, then it makes sense to only
analyze taxpayer data based on income level. However, if taxpayer data is only
collected and analyzed based on income level, there is no possible way to
establish that there are other salient features that warrant attention.221
By contrast, agencies across the federal government regularly collect and
use demographic data relating to race, ethnicity, disability, and gender.222 Beyond
these recognized categories, the Department of Health and Human Services has
recently announced that it will start collecting data on sexual orientation and
gender identity for certain purposes. 223 Even the Department of the Treasury
collects demographic data on race for some non-tax related purposes, such as the
Home Affordable Modification Program.224 In some instances, the data collection
is mandated in order to measure compliance with anti-discrimination laws, but in
220

See, e.g., Richard Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal Income Tax: Has a Disparate Impact
Case Been Made?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1823 (1998).
221
In other words, starting from a strong presumption of taxpayer neutrality mandates that there is
no possible way to test the original presumption because any data that could potentially undermine
the presumption has been deemed irrelevant and, as a result, does not exist.
222
Federal public policy has been race and diversity conscious since the mid-1960s.
223
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Affordable Care Act to Improve Data Collection,
Reduce Health Disparities, June 29, 2011, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/06/20110629a.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). Under
Section 4302 of the Affordable Care Act, data collection efforts to understand health disparities
relating to race, ethnicity, sex, primary language and disability status are required. However, the
Secretary has authority to require additional standards. HHS has announced that it will integrate
questions on sexual orientation into national data collection efforts by 2013 and begin a process to
collect information on gender identity. Id.
224
Applicants and homeowners in the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”)
program are requested, but not required, to provide race and ethnicity information in order to
obtain a mortgage modification. Making Home Affordable Data File Summary,
MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.GOV (Jan. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/reports/Documents/MHA%20Data%20File%20Summary_ new.pdf.
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other instances it is used to track and address existing disparities. Given that
taxation is a component of the broader fiscal policy and includes significant
spending items in the form of tax expenditures, the IRS’s lack of interest in
demographic differences in terms of its burdens or benefits seems out of step with
the practices of other federal agencies.
Federal public policy has been diversity-conscious since the mid-1960s
when the passage of landmark civil rights legislation made reliable demographic
data essential for enforcement purposes. For example, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 mandated equal treatment in the workforce and created the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to monitor compliance
with the law.225 To assist in its enforcement efforts, the EEOC imposed reporting
requirements on certain employers regarding the race and ethnicity of their
employees. 226 Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
collects data to measure compliance with the Fair Housing Act of 1968.227 Indeed,
the collection of demographic data relating to race and ethnicity became so
widespread, that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) later formalized
the standards to be used for all federal purposes when collecting data on race or
ethnicity in Directive 15.228
Beyond enforcement efforts, information collection is essential to many
federal programs that are funded based on data from the decennial Census,
including programs that promote equal employment opportunities and those that
assess racial disparities in health and environmental risks.229 Demographic data is
also necessary to monitor compliance with the Voting Rights Act and the
bilingual election rules. 230 There are also obligations imposed on local
governments, which are required to identify underserved segments of the
population, such as those requiring medical services under the Public Health
Service Act. 231 Demographic data is also necessary to ensure that financial
institutions are meeting the credit needs of minority populations under the
Community Reinvestment Act. 232 When the OMB last revised Directive 15, it
225

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2012).
Id.
227
Catherine Lee & John D. Skrentny, Race Categorization and the Regulation of Business and
Science, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 617, 618 (2010) (explaining that “in 1965 this agency issued a
regulation requiring all businesses with at least 100 employees to fill out a form, the EEO-1, that
categorized all employees based on their employer-perceived identities as white, black, ‘SpanishAmerican,’ ‘Oriental,’ or ‘American Indian’”).
228
Id. at 617-19 (describing the history of OMB Directive 15).
229
Definition: Ethnic Groups, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, available at
https://ask.census.gov/faq.php?id =5000&faqId=7557.
230
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq.
231
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
232
Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901 et seq.
226
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organized an interagency working group that was comprised of representatives
from thirty different agencies that utilized demographic data in their program
development and implementation,233 representing the breadth of data collection
efforts across the federal government.
2. Too much, too little, or not at all
Despite the fact that there is a long history at the federal level of collecting
demographic data for the commendable purpose of furthering civil rights, the
practice has recently been the subject of sustained criticism from a variety of
interests. LGBT advocacy organizations have increasingly argued that sexual
orientation and gender identity should be queried on the Census and other national
surveys, such as the National Health Interview Survey administered by the
National Institutes of Health. 234 Multiracial advocates have argued for the
expansion of racial categories or have rejected them completely. 235 The
proponents of “racial privacy” have also argued against the use of racial
categories but on starkly different grounds. 236 Accordingly, any proposal to
increase data collection for tax purposes would likely encounter criticism on a
number of fronts.
At first glance, the objections of LGBT advocacy groups seems easy to
remedy—simply add a query regarding sexual orientation and gender identity to
all relevant national data sets. By advocating in favor of extending diversityconscious federal policies to include LGBT individuals, LGBT organizations
accept the importance of demographic data as an effective way to monitor civil
rights protections. 237 However, the country remains deeply divided over issues
233

See Kim M. Williams, Racial Statistics and Race-Conscious Public Policy. TAUBMAN CENTER
POLICY BRIEF, May 2007, at 3, available at
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centersprograms/centers/taubman/williams_new.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2013) (describing the interagency working group). See also Lee & Skrentny, supra note 227,at 618 (In terms of the range of
agencies collecting data, Lee and Skrentny noted that “[t]he National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Revitalization Act of 1993 required the NIH to establish guidelines for including women and
minorities in clinical research—called the Inclusion Mandate, which the agency implemented in
1994.”).
234
National Coalition for LGBT Health, LGBT Inclusion in Federal Health Surveys, (Dec. 2010),
available at
http://lgbthealth.webolutionary.com/sites/default/files/LGBT%20Inclusion%20in%20Surveys_0.p
df (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
235
See Williams, supra note 233 (describing the goals of the “multi-racial movement”).
236
Patricia J. Williams, Racial Privacy, THE NATION, June 17, 2002 (describing the “racial privacy
movement”).
237
The President of the Human Rights Campaign explained that data collection was necessary to
“understand if the country is meeting the public-policy needs of [LGBT] Americans.” Carroll
Morello, Census Count of Same-Sex Couples to Stir Policy Fights, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2009
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related to LGBT civil rights, suggesting that the inclusion of sexual orientation
and gender identity would not be without controversy. For example, leading up to
the 2010 Census, the Census Bureau took the position that it would not be able to
“count” the same-sex couples who reported that they were “married”238 because
to do so would violate DOMA.239 Even if it were possible to get a consensus that
sexual orientation and gender identity should be included in the critical lens and,
therefore, data on sexual orientation and gender identity should be collected, there
remains considerable disagreement and uncertainty regarding how best to pose
questions that would capture the full range of LGBT lives and identities.240
In contrast to the LGBT groups who want to be included in the data
collection, there are other groups who want to be able to opt out of the data
collection. The multiracial movement that began in the 1990s argued that the
racial categories reflected on the Census and prescribed through OMB’s Directive
15 were overly reductive by forcing individuals to choose a single identity
category.241 The movement was successful, in part, by getting OMB to endorse a
“mark one or more” (MOOM) approach such that respondents can now choose
more than one category to reflect intersecting or multiple identities.242
Related to the multiracial objection, there is also a post-racial or postidentity critique that argues against the collection of racial and ethnic data by the
federal government on the grounds that it reinforces a socially constructed
category of difference that has historically been used as a tool of subordination.243
(quoting Joe Solmonese, then-President of the Human Rights Campaign). See also Williams,
supra note 233, at 2 (explaining that “in the 1960s, racial classifications became useful for the
purpose of enforcing and monitoring civil rights laws”).
238
Morello, supra note 237 (explaining the controversy).
239
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7).
240
See Gary J. Gates, LGBT Identity: A Demographer’s Perspective, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693
(2012).
241
Williams, supra note 233 (“The American multiracial movement is best known for its
advocates’ efforts, throughout the 1990s, to add a “multiracial” category to the 2000 census.”).
242
Id.
243
Kimani Paul-Emile, The Regulation of Race in Science, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1115, 11311132 (2012). Paul-Emile provides the following definition of race in the context of biomedical
research:
Race is a social construct, which means that racial categories, the meaning we
attach to these categories, and the way we determine which individuals will be
assigned to these categories, are all driven by social, cultural, and historical
practices, and are not determined a priori by genetics. We assign certain
meanings (e.g., stereotypes and attitudes) to the racial categories we have
constructed, which inform the ways individuals and groups are perceived.
Id. See also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
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The post-identity concern is that the continued deployment of outmoded and
artificial categories by the federal government has the effect of naturalizing race,
and racializing certain government policies and practices. The response to the
post-racial critique is that although race is socially constructed, it continues to
have social, political, and economic consequences and meaning.244 As a result,
“racial pragmatism” would dictate that salient identity characteristics continue to
be taken into account for purposes of building a diversity-conscious policy that
remains aware of the limitations and dangers inherent in the act of
characterization.245
The racial privacy movement also objects to the collection of demographic
data by the government but on very different grounds. The movement started as
an outgrowth of the anti-affirmative action movement that had argued
successfully in the 1990s against preferences based on race, gender, and
ethnicity.246 The racial privacy movement, however, takes that argument against
racial or ethnic preferences one step further. It asserts that the government should
not collect information on race or ethnicity in the first instance—let alone use it
for preferences. The racial privacy movement asserts that the collection of such
information by the government violates privacy rights by compelling an
individual to divulge racially identifying information. 247 In 2004, California
voters defeated Proposition 54 that would have prohibited state and local
governments from using race, ethnicity, color, or national origin to classify
current or prospective students, contractors or employees in public education,
contracting, or employment operations.248 Although the initiative was defeated, it
still garnered over three million votes.249
The racial privacy movement posed a direct challenge to civil rights
protections and safeguards by claiming that the government should be prohibited
(NYU Press 1st ed. 1996).
244
Paul-Emile, supra note 243, at 1131. As Paul-Emile observes, “the overwhelming consensus
among geneticists majority is that ‘among modern humans, there’s no such thing as race.’”
(quoting Joseph L. Graves, Jr., Ph.D., Dean of University Studies and Professor of Biological
Sciences, North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University).
245
Paul-Emile endorses “racial pragmatism in the biomedical . . . context.” Id. at 1168. He
concludes: “This Article argues that federal regulations must allow for the use of racial categories
in biomedical studies. However, they must do so in a way that does not allow researchers to
jeopardize individual and public health or reify outmoded, pejorative, and stigmatizing notions of
racial distinctions.” Id. at 1173.
246
See Glenn C. Loury, When Color Should Count, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2002) (arguing in favor of
“modest violations of race blindness that yield significant reductions in racial inequality”),
available at http://www.nytimes. com/2002/07/28/ opinion/when-color-should-count.html.
247
Id.
248
2003 California State-Wide Special Election: Proposition 54, CAL. SECRETARY OF STATE,
http://vote2003.sos.ca.gov/Returns/prop/mapR054.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
249
Id.
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from collecting demographic data. Without reliable data, it would be impossible
to enforce anti-discrimination laws or measure disparities.250 In some ways, racial
privacy could also describe the current “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy in place for
taxpayer information.251 Willful blindness of the type mandated by Proposition 54
or practiced under the myth of taxpayer neutrality does not change the reality of
inequality or the persistence of bigotry and bias. When asked to comment on
Proposition 54, the American Association of Sociologists explained that “refusing
to employ racial categories for administrative purposes and for social research
does not eliminate their use in daily life, both by individuals and within social and
252
economic institutions.”
B. Diversity Expenditure Budget
A diversity expenditure budget would make visible the allocation of tax
benefits by race, gender, ethnicity, and whatever other classifications were
included in the critical lens. In 1998 Beverly Moran called for Congress to create
a “Race Expenditure Budget” that would “parallel the annual Tax Expenditure
Budget” and show “what racial disparities exist in the enjoyment of tax
benefits.”253 Her proposal clearly presaged the growing call for “gender-sensitive”
250

For example, in 1996 California voters approved ballot initiative Proposition 209, which
prohibited state government institutions from considering race, sex, or ethnicity, specifically in the
areas of public employment, public contracting, or public education. B. Drummond Ayres,
Affirmative Action Battle Moves to the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996. The success of
Proposition 209 was followed by the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court cases, Gratz v. Bollinger and
Grutter v. Bollinger that challenged the race-based admissions policies at the University of
Michigan. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
251
Patricia J. Williams, Racial Privacy, THE NATION (May 30, 2002), available at
http://www.thenation.com/ article/racial-privacy.
252
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL ASS’N, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION ON
THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTING DATA AND DOING SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON RACE
(2003) available at http://www2.asanet.org/ media/asa_race_statement.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2013). The American Sociological Association supported data collection because:
[A] large body of social science research documents the role and consequences
of race in primary social institutions and environments, including the criminal
justice, education and health systems, job markets, and where people live. These
studies illustrate how racial hierarchies are embedded in daily life, from racial
profiling in law enforcement, to ‘red-lining’ communities of color in mortgage
lending, to sharp disparities in the health of members of different population
groups.
Id.
253

Moran, supra note 38, at 1634. In an earlier article with William Whitford, Moran had
forcefully argued that “Ignoring the impact that the Internal Revenue Code has on black welfare is
a tradition that must stop.” Moran & Whitford, supra note 26, at 803.
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budgeting,254 but it chose race as the distinguishing feature and used the familiar
concept of the tax expenditure budget as a point of reference. 255 A diversity
expenditure budget would broaden Moran’s call for a “Race Expenditure Budget”
to include gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and potentially other
identity groups as well.
As explained in Part I, the tax expenditure budget was mandated by
Congress in 1974. 256 The President’s annual budget submission to Congress is
required to contain a list of tax expenditures, prepared by the Treasury
Department. 257 The Joint Committee on Taxation also prepares its own tax
expenditure budget. 258 The addition of demographic information would allow
policymakers (and voters) to see how tax expenditures, such as the mortgage
interest deduction, are allocated across identity groups. By disrupting the blanket
assumption of taxpayer neutrality, the diversity expenditure budget would directly
further the original goals of the tax expenditure budget, namely increased
transparency and better budget management. 259 It would also treat tax
expenditures more in line with other types of fiscal programs where the federal
government expresses concerns over disparities and unequal access.
A diversity expenditure budget also finds support in the concept of “gender
budgeting” that has been implemented in a number of countries.260 Popularized
after the 1995 United Nations Fourth Congress on Women in Beijing, gender
budgeting is designed to further distributive transparency. 261 The Platform of
Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women called on
governments to “[f]acilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and transparent
budget processes” 262 and mandated “the integration of a gender perspective in
254

See Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 843 (describing the advent of gender-sensitive
budgeting).
255
When Surrey sought to make visible a form of indirect spending that was otherwise hidden
within the tax code, his goal was to improve the budgeting process by requiring policymakers to
acknowledge openly the various preferences and subsidies that represented departures from the
structural provisions of the code. See Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33.
256
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688
(1974).
257
Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 33.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 843 (discussing gender-sensitive budgeting). For an
overview of Gender Responsive Budget Initiatives, see generally U.N. Women, U.N. Women
Initiatives, GENDER RESPONSIVE BUDGETING, http://www.genderbudgets.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15& Itemid=187 (last visited Apr.
5, 2013).
261
Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 843. See also Rep. of Fourth World Conf. on Women,
Sept. 4-15, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996); U.N. Women, GENDER RESPONSIVE
BUDGETING, http://www.gender-budgets.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
262
Rep. of Fourth World Conf. on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1
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budgetary decisions on policies and programs.”263 A “gender-sensitive budget” is
designed to question fiscal policy that is presumed to be neutral and explore its
impact in light of gender roles and the differing economic status of men and
women.264
Gender budgeting is a component of a larger move toward “gender
mainstreaming” that has gained international acceptance and could provide a
useful model for the development and implementation of a critical lens not only
for tax policy, but for all domestic fiscal policy.265 Consistent with the goals of
critical tax policy, gender mainstreaming focuses on revealing false neutrality. For
example, a report on gender mainstreaming from the Council of Europe,
recommends that efforts should first focus on points widely held to be “genderneutral,” saying the results will be “eye-opening.” The report stated:
It might be useful to start with gender mainstreaming policy areas
that are habitually labelled as gender-neutral. All policy areas
which affect the daily life of citizens, such as transport policies,
urban policies, [and] social policies are definitely important,
although this is often not recognised. The same goes for research
policies, because this is an important area to generate knowledge.
Mainstreaming these policy areas might be very efficient, given the
eye-opening effect it will produce. This effect will be very useful
for convincing policy-makers and people of the need for gender
mainstreaming, even when basic gender equality seems to be
achieved.266

(1996). See also Commonwealth Secretariat, GENDER AFFAIRS DEP’T, DEBBIE BUDLENDER ET AL.,
GENDER BUDGETS MAKE CENTS: UNDERSTANDING GENDER RESPONSIVE BUDGETS 1 (2002).
263
Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37, at 845. The immediate response from the United Nations and
other international entities was to provide support for a wide range of “gender budgeting” projects.
264
Id. at 843. Phillips & Stewart note, “A variety of methods are used to reveal and analyze the
differential impacts of taxes and spending on women and men, in terms of both the distribution of
costs and benefits, and behavioral effects (for example, marginal choices between paid and unpaid
labor, or the effectiveness of business incentives).” Id.
265
Martha Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of An Antidiscrimination Approach To
Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012). See also Equal. Div., Directorate Gen. of Human Rights,
Council of Eur., Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation
of Good Practices 23 (2005), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gendermainstreaming/EG_S_MS_98_2_rev_en.pdf (providing a comprehensive review of gender
mainstreaming, including reports on various governments' processes) (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
266
Fineman, supra note 265, at 1740 (quoting Equal. Div., Directorate Gen. of Human Rights,
Council of Eur., Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation
of good Practices 23 (2004), available at
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Turning back to critical tax policy, a diversity expenditure budget would
provide crucial information for policy makers. As a component of the budgeting
process, it would greatly advance transparency goals. With the information
provided by the diversity expenditure budget, policymakers would have access to
distributional data broken down by relevant demographics characteristics.
Whether they choose to act on the data or not, they would at least have to
acknowledge the distributional effects. The diversity expenditure budget could be
implemented by an act of Congress like the original tax expenditure or instituted
through executive action that would direct the Department of Treasury to prepare
as an optional budget to reflect these certain distributional concerns.
C. Diversity Assessment Statement
Although a diversity expenditure budget would allow for reflection on the
part of policy maker, a diversity impact statement described below could
conceivably act as a filter or check for all major government actions. A diversity
impact statement would be to evaluate governmental actions before they are
implemented in order to determine the potential for disparate impact on the
different identity groups defined by race, gender, ethnicity, and whatever other
classifications were included in the critical lens. In this way, a diversity impact
statement would help policy makers avoid the unintended consequences that can
arise when implicit bias becomes incorporated in the tax code. The diversity
impact statement could be restricted to taxation or extended more broadly.
Similarly, it could be limited to regulatory action or extend to legislative action as
well.
The concept of a diversity impact statement finds support in the wellestablished practice of imposing various value-based requirements or safeguards
on legislative and agency action. 267 Starting in the 1970s, the legislative and
executive branches both began to impose requirements on agency action that were
designed to ensure that it was consistent with other broadly held federal policies.
268
These requirements were sometimes in the form of “impact assessments” or

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/equality/03themes/gendermainstreaming/EG_S_MS_98_2_ rev_en.pdf ).
267
Although some impact assessments have applied to legislative action, the majority have been
designed to curtail agency power.
268
The most well-known impact assessment is the environmental impact statement. The
International Association for Impact Assessment (“IAIA”) defines an environmental impact
assessment as “the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical,
social, and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken
and commitments made.” What is Impact Assessment?, INT’L ASS’N OF IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Oct.
2009) available at http://www.iaia.org/publicdocuments/special-publications/What%20is%20IA
_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
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could also take the form of balancing tests.269 Over the years, these value-specific
policy lenses have included environmental risks, 270 respect for federalism, 271
respect for the family, 272 concern over takings issues, 273 and the impact of
regulation on small businesses. 274 These “impact assessments” or “impact
statements”275 required the agency to undergo a process of evaluation designed to
predict the effect of proposed federal agency action on a pre-defined set of values
or standards. 276 Accordingly, “impact assessments” have the power to impose
specific value checks on otherwise value-blind policy, and they represent a
familiar way to implement the critical lens that is essential to critical tax policy.
Perhaps the most well-known impact assessment is the Environmental
269

See, e.g., The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 864 (1980) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612) (mandates consideration of impact of proposed regulations on
small businesses and other small entities). Early in his first term, President Reagan expanded
executive control over rulemaking with Executive Order 12,291. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193, 3 C.F.R., 1981 Comp., p. 127 (Feb. 17,1981). This Executive Order required federal
agencies to take regulatory action only if, “the potential benefits to society for the regulation
outweigh the potential costs to society.” Id. Agencies were also instructed to submit to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) a “regulatory impact analysis” of the potential costs and
benefits for any proposed rule likely to be economically significant. Id.
270
See the Nat’l Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347d, requiring the development
of the Environmental Impact Statement.
271
Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg.R 41,685, 3 C.F.R., 1987 Comp., p. 252 (Oct. 26, 1987).
Executive Order 12,612 (entitled ‘‘Federalism’’) prohibits an agency from publishing any rule that
has federalism implications if the rule either: (i) Imposes substantial direct compliance costs on
State and local governments and is not required by statute, or (ii) preempts State law, unless the
agency meets the consultation and funding requirements of section 6 of the Executive Order.
272
Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188, 3 C.F.R. 1987 Comp., 241 (Sept. 9, 1987)
(entitled “The Family”).
273
Executive Order 12,630 addressed the New Right’s belief that individual private property rights
were being eroded by the actions of the federal government. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg.
8859, 3 C.F.R., 1988 Comp., 554 (Mar. 15, 1988). It ordered agency action to take into account
the “obligations imposed on the Federal government by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. To some extent, impact assessments such as these do not really break any new
ground. In many cases, agencies are simply being urged to comply with the demands of the U.S.
Constitution.
274
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”), 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., generally requires an agency
to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis of any rule subject to notice and comment rulemaking
requirements, unless the agency certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The key requirement of the law is that federal agencies
must analyze the impact of their regulatory actions on small entities (small businesses, small nonprofit organizations and small jurisdictions of government) and, where the regulatory impact is
likely to be “significant”, affecting a “substantial number” of these small entities, seek less
burdensome alternatives for them.
275
The statute requires an agency to include a statement on “the environmental impact” as well as
alternatives to the proposed course of action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) and (iii) (2013).
276
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).

258

Vol. 9.2]

Nancy J. Knaur

Impact Statement (“EIS”), which was introduced by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”).277 NEPA required federal agencies to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in advance of certain agency actions
“significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” in order to assess
their potential impact.278 An EIS is required to describe:
1)
2)
3)
4)

5)

the environmental impacts of the proposed action;
any adverse environmental impacts that cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
the reasonable alternatives to the proposed action;
the relationship between local short-term uses of the
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity; and
any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
that would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.279

Designed as a tool to enhance federal decision-making, the goal of the EIS
is to make sure that federal agency action is based on informed and thorough
analysis that takes environmental concerns into account. 280 The supersonic
Concorde provided the first major test for the EIS, 281 when environmental
advocates successfully stalled its introduction to U.S. airspace in the 1970s.282
Immediately after the perceived success of the environmentalists, progressive
family advocates lobbied for an impact statement requirement for any government
277

The Nat’l Environmental Policy Act of 1969, P.L. 91-190, § 2, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as 42
U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.). The first widely publicized application of the new EIS requirements was
the successful delay of the Super Sonic Transport (SST), also known as the Concorde. Robert B.
Donin, Safety Regulation of the Concorde: Realistic Confinement of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 47 (1976). Environmentalists objected to the potential for noise
pollution, as well as the plane’s impact on the ozone, its lack of fuel efficiency, and its safety risks.
Walter Sullivan, Experts Fear Great Peril if SST Fumes Cool Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1975,
at 32. After a period of public comment, the Secretary of Transportation provisionally approved
SST flights from the two airports, but called the decision “difficult and close.” Robert B. Donin,
Safety Regulation of the Concorde: Realistic Confinement of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 47 (1976) (quoting Secretary of Transportation, William T. Colman, Jr.).
278
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
279
Id.
280
See generally SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 5 (1984) (assessing whether environmental
impact statements have institutionalized “a greater sensitivity to environmental risks in the federal
bureaucracy”).
281
Donin, supra note 277.
282
Although the Concorde was eventually approved, its flights were sharply curtailed in terms of
both location and number and environmentalists consider it to have been a huge success.
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action affecting the family. 283 However, the concept of an impact statement
proved to have no ideological limits and the family impact statement was
eventually taken over by advocates of “traditional values” during the Reagan
administration. 284 At the same time, a number of safeguards representing
conservative values were imposed by both Congress and the executive branch.285
More recently, there has been increased progressive interest in the concept, and
recent proposals have included an “interest impact statement” 286 and a
“constitutional impact statement.”287 There has also been interest expressed at the
state level. 288 Iowa, for example, has imposed the requirement of a “minority
impact statement” whenever there is proposed legislation regarding sentencing.289
The example of Iowa’s minority impact statement as it applies to
sentencing illustrates the importance and strength of demographic data. The
impact statement legislation was introduced after statistics showed that Iowa
ranked first among the states in its rate of incarceration for African Americans but
had the third lowest rate of incarceration rate for white prisoners. 290 A closer
283

Robin S. Maril, Regulating The Family: The Impact Of Pro-Family Policymaking Assessments
On Women And Nontraditional Families, BALT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Krishnakumar, supra note 132, at 30 (“Once a committee has submitted a legislative proposal
and ‘interest impact’ statement to CBO/GAO, that entity then should be required to prepare an
impact report evaluating: (1) the impact in qualitative and, if possible, quantitative terms, that the
bill is expected to have on List groups; and (2) the benefits the bill is expected to confer on other
groups.”).
287
See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50
DUKE L. J. 1277, 1310-11 (2001) (explaining a two-step procedure for all bills that would require a
“constitutional impact statement”).
288
Iowa became the first state to enact a minority impact statement in 2008. U.S. State News, Gov.
Culver Signs Nation’s First Racial Impact Sentencing Bill, Apr. 22, 2008 (issuing statement of
Iowa Public Defender). When the Iowa minority impact statement bill was signed into law, the
Iowa Public Defender noted that “Iowa is the first state to pass legislation examining the racial and
ethnic impact of new criminal justice policies.” Id. He also observed that “Bills to enact minority
impact statements are . . . pending in Connecticut and Illinois [and] [l]ast year, Oregon was the
first state to introduce similar legislation.” Id. The impact statement concept has also been
suggested in other areas, such as Medicaid. See, e.g., Michael Campbell, Did I Do That? An
Argument for Requiring Pennsylvania to Evaluate the Racial Impact of Medicaid Policy Decisions
Prior to Implementation, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1163 (2010) (recommending that “prior to publication
of proposed regulations, the Medicaid agency first assesses the racial impact of its proposed
policies and then presents these findings publicly”).
289
Gov. Culver Signs Nation’s First Racial Impact Sentencing Bill, U.S. STATE NEWS, Apr. 22,
2008, 2008 WLNR 10805010 (explaining that the law “provides a means for legislators to
anticipate any unwarranted disparities and enables them to consider alternative policies to
accomplish the goals of legislation without causing undue negative effects on public safety”).
290
Criminal Justice & Juvenile Planning, Minority Impact Statements: One Approach to Racial
Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, available at
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inspection of the data showed that the point of departure was not in the rate of
arrests or even convictions but that it occurred at the sentencing phase.291 The
minority impact statement is required to accompany any legislation related to a
“public offense, sentencing, or parole and probation procedures.”292 The statement
must include:
1)
2)
3)

any disproportionate or unique impact of proposed policies or
programs on minority persons in Iowa;
a rationale for the existence of programs or policies having an
impact on minority persons in Iowa; and
evidence of consultation with representatives of minority
persons in cases where a policy or program has an identifiable
impact on minority persons in Iowa.293

The specific requirements imposed through these impact statements
represent a belief that the imposition of a predetermined policy lens can
effectively direct and guide the development and implementation of policy. The
articulation of impact is also consistent with the growing international
commitment to gender mainstreaming that explores ways to develop an
independent and official assessment of the gendered implications and
consequences of specific plans or proposals.294 Following the existing models, a
proto-typical diversity impact statement would include the following:
1)
2)

the demographic impact of the proposed policies or actions;
any disproportionate or unique impact of the proposed policies
or actions on designated minority populations;

http://www.jrsa.org/events/conference/presentations-09/Phyllis_Blood.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2013). See also Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: States Rates of Incarceration by
Race and Ethnicity, July 2007, available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincby raceandethnicity.pdf (last
visited Mar. 31, 2013).
291
Criminal Justice & Juvenile Planning, Minority Impact Statements: One Approach to Racial
Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, available at
http://www.jrsa.org/events/conference/presentations-09/Phyllis_Blood.pdf (last visited Apr. 4,
2013).
292
The legislation also required any application for a grant from a state of Iowa agency to include
a minority impact statement. Iowa Code § 8.11 (2013). The law defines “minorities” as
“individuals who are women, persons with a disability, African Americans, Latinos, Asians or
Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Alaskan Native Americans.” Iowa Code § 8.11.2.b.
(2013).
293
Wayne Ford, Bills Push ‘One Iowa’ In Studying Minority Impact With Grants, Crime, DES
MOINES REGISTER (IOWA), Apr. 1, 2008, at 11W.
294
Phillips & Stewart, supra note 37 (describing gender mainstreaming).
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reasonable alternatives to the proposed policies or actions that
do not have a disproportionate or unique impact on designated
minority populations;
the rationale for the existence of policies or actions having a
disproportionate or unique impact on designated minority
populations; and
the relationship between such policies or actions and the longterm goals of tax reform, including considerations of equity,
efficiency, and ease of administration.

A diversity impact assessment would obviously impose an additional cost
on federal decision making.295 One thing to consider is the level of specificity that
would be required by the diversity impact assessment. On one hand, it would not
be desirable to have a completely pro forma impact assessment.296 On the other
hand, too much detail could prove to be an unnecessary drag on the legislative
and regulatory process. Regardless of the degree of detail and specificity required,
the notion of an impact assessment offers a formal way to impose a critical lens
on federal policy making.
CONCLUSION
This Article outlines the essential framework of Critical Tax Policy—a new
method of inquiry that incorporates the insights of a growing international tax
equity movement as well as the observations of critical tax scholars who write
from a diverse range of outsider perspectives. Such a project is timely given the
renewed calls for fundamental tax reform in the wake of the Global Recession and
accompanying austerity measures. Critical Tax Policy challenges the multiple
assumptions of neutrality that undergird our present system of taxation and
recognizes that facially neutral tax policy can reinforce existing inequities and
295

The imposition of a diversity impact statement would greatly increase the paperwork burden.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) is required to report to the Congress on the paperwork burden imposed on the public by
the Federal Government and on efforts to reduce that burden. Since the enactment of the original
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, OMB has complied with this reporting requirement by issuing
an Information Collection Budget (“ICB”). The 2012 ICB reports on the paperwork burden
imposed on the public during fiscal year 2011 and explores other issues pertaining to the
implementation of the PRA. Office of Budget and Management, Information Collection Budget
2012, (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/icb/icb_2012.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2013).
296
Maril, supra note 283 (noting that the requirement of the Family Impact Statement was often
pro forma and conclusory).
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biases. It also acknowledges the constitutive role of tax policy in the larger
“blueprint for the aims and ambitions of the nation state.”297
The overriding goal of Critical Tax Policy is to make tax policy more
informed, transparent, and responsive to the needs of individual taxpayers. This
Article suggests a number of ways that the development of tax policy would differ
(both procedurally and substantively) if critical perspectives were incorporated
from the earliest stages. It engages instances of explicit and implicit bias in
existing tax provisions and the potential for bias in the case of discretionary
actions. Specifically, this Article proposes three policy innovations or safeguards
that draw on longstanding institutional practices and procedures: (1) enhanced
information collection; (2) the creation of a diversity expenditure budget; and (3)
the requirement of a diversity impact statement.
All of these proposals would further the goals of Critical Tax Policy, but
each of them comes with a separate set of costs and countervailing policy
concerns. Accordingly, they do not represent a definitive way to implement the
addition of a critical lens. At best, they should be regarded as a starting point in
the ongoing project of building an informed, transparent and responsive approach
to tax policy that incorporates considerations of difference and acknowledges its
potential role in the perpetuation of inequality.

297

MUMFORD, supra note 12, at 3 (crediting Joseph Schumpeter with the observation regarding the
budget function).
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